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Bioethics, Philosophy, and Global Health
Maria Merritt*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the present state and future prospects of the field of
bioethics. The subject is open to more than one attitude of address. Possibilities
include preoccupation with the professional status of bioethics, critical scrutiny
of its research programs and methodologies, and anxiety about whether some
areas of bioethics have become intertwined with-and perhaps co-opted by-
extra-professional, extra-academic agendas, such as those that drive profit-
making enterprises (pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, HMOs) or partisan politics
(debates over abortion, stem cell research, withdrawing artificial nutrition and
hydration from patients like Terri Schiavo). These attitudes, whatever their
merits, are all somewhat self-focused. Without denying the importance of the
problems they target or the necessity of continual self-critical reflection among
the practitioners and friends of bioethics, this Article assumes a more
straightforward, outward-looking stance.
This stance is meant to complement the inward-looking attitudes and to
affirm the values that motivate them. Those of us who work in bioethics can
demonstrate the professional and academic value of our field only through the
substance of the contributions we make in its name. With respect to worries
about inappropriate involvement with corporate or partisan agendas, the issue is
protecting the intellectual integrity we need in order to make headway on
problems whose solutions cannot be left to the rough-and-tumble of the market
and the political arena. We ought to set our own research agenda, rather than
acquiesce in its distortion by external interests, political pressures, and popular
sensations du jour.1
Hence the straightforward question: What belongs on our agenda? One item
* Maria Merritt, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Health at
the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and a core faculty member of the Johns
Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. She earned her doctorate in philosophy at the University of
California, Berkeley, and held a postdoctoral fellowship in the Department of Clinical Bioethics at
the National Institutes of Health. Her work on this Article was supported in part by a Faculty
Fellowship in the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics at Harvard University. Grateful
acknowledgement is also due to the editors of the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics,
especially Natalie Ram, for superb editorial guidance at every stage of writing and revision.
1. Distortion by external factors is a danger to which bioethics is exposed by its
interdisciplinary orientation, which may tend to loosen the ties that anchor scholars to their home
disciplines. Thanks to Dennis F. Thompson for this observation.
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that certainly belongs on it is global health. This Article surveys a constellation
of global health problems that exert increasing influence in bioethics today and
indicate promising directions for future research.
"Global health" is an expression used to talk about issues in health policy
that reach beyond or across national boundaries. The authors of a recent article in
the American Journal of Public Health characterize its meaning partly by
contrasting it with another expression used for similar purposes-"intemational
health":
"International health" was already a term of considerable currency in the late
19th and early 20th century, when it referred primarily to a focus on the control
of epidemics across the boundaries between nations .... "Global health," in
general, implies consideration of the health needs of the people of the whole
planet above the concerns of particular nations.
2
A distinct interest in "global health" is on the rise, as measured by the frequency
of its mention in the scholarly literature and its visibility in the names of
academic, government, and philanthropic organizations concerned with
transnational matters of public health.3
From the viewpoint of ordinary morality, the notion of global health captures
several interconnected themes. First, it seems obviously wrong that poor people
across the world, many of them infants and small children, should suffer the
ravages of illness and death from conditions (like pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria,
tuberculosis, AIDS, and even childbirth) that can be treated, prevented, or
managed by methods readily available to most people in rich countries. Two
further themes bring in causal interconnections related to the globalization of
trade, labor, finance, transportation, communication, culture, and climate change.
We all participate in the institutional systems that perpetuate or could alleviate
the conditions of poverty that prove so lethal to the most vulnerable populations.
Finally, we are also all embedded in-and ourselves potentially vulnerable to-
the biological, social, and environmental systems through which globalization
affects health, as already threatened by infectious diseases like SARS, West Nile
virus, avian flu, and drug-resistant forms of tuberculosis.4
Academic bioethics is beginning to pick up these same themes, generally
with greater emphasis on the first two.f In so doing, bioethics follows a pattern of
2. Theodore M. Brown et al., The World Health Organization and the Transition from
International to Global Public Health, 96 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 62, 62 (2006); see also Kelley Lee &
Derek Yach, Globalization and Health, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc HEALTH: DISEASES, PROGRAMS,
SYSTEMS, AND POLICIES 681 (Michael H. Merson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH].
3. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 62; see also Susan Okie, Global Health - The Gates-Buffett
Effect, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1084 (2006).
4. Lee & Yach, supra note 2, at 687-89.
5. See, e.g., Gopal Sreenivasan & Solomon Benatar, Challenges for Global Health in the 2 1st
VII:2 (2007)
2
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol7/iss2/2
BIOETHICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND GLOBAL HEALTH
concern established by moral and political philosophy in the latter part of the
twentieth century. The harms suffered by the world's very poor, together with the
causal involvement of the affluent in the global systems that perpetuate these
harms, invite continuing examination of a central question in moral philosophy:
Who owes what to whom? 6 In political philosophy, a form of the same question
re-emerges at the institutional level: What do affluent states, acting both on their
own and through international agencies, owe to the poor in other countries? This
question of global distributive justice defines one of the most active areas of
current political philosophy.7 At the same time, philosophers are participating in
the formation of global health policy with increasing frequency.8
Responding to problems of public health that occur in both domestic and
international contexts, some bioethicists have begun to urge a shift in perspective
to "population-level bioethics." 9 "Where clinical bioethics speaks of the rights
and responsibilities of patients and doctors, bioethics at the population level
assesses the obligations of societies toward their members and each other and the
norms governing complex relationships of individuals, groups, and the state."'
' 0
Yet, even from the viewpoint of this shift in perspective, individuals do not drop
Century: Some Upstream Considerations, 27 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHIcS 3 (2006); Alex John
London, What is Social and Global Justice to Bioethics or Bioethics to Social and Global Justice?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 2006, at 3.
6. See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT (2002); PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR
ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996); Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
229 (1972).
7. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Extra Republicam Nulla Justitia?, 34 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 147 (2006); Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113
(2005).
8. See, e.g., HEALTH, WELL-BEING, JUSTICE: ETHICAL ISSUES IN HEALTH RESOURCE
ALLOCATION (Christopher J.L. Murray & Daniel Wikler eds., forthcoming 2007); Dan W. Brock,
The Separability of Health and Well-Being, in SUMMARY MEASURES OF POPULATION HEALTH:
CONCEPTS, ETHICS, MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATIONS 115 (Christopher J.L. Murray et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter SUMMARY MEASURES]; John Broome, Measuring the Burden of Disease by
Aggregating Well-Being, in SUMMARY MEASURES, supra, at 9; Norman Daniels, Fair Process in
Patient Selection for Antiretroviral Treatment in WHO's Goal of 3 by 5, 366 LANCET 169 (2005);
Frances P. Kamm, Health and Equity, in SUMMARY MEASURES, supra, at 685.
9. See Norman Daniels, Equity and Population Health: Toward a Broader Bioethics Agenda,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 2006, at 22-23 (arguing that bioethics has myopically focused on
special doctor-patient or researcher-subject relationships, and sensational questions about new
technologies, at the expense of "examining the broader institutional settings and policies that
mediate population health"); Daniel Wikler & Dan W. Brock, Population-Level Bioethics:
Mapping a New Agenda (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the population-
level perspective reveals ethical problems that extend beyond health care to other determinants of
health, beyond the domestic U.S. setting to the least-healthy populations worldwide, and beyond
the present to the health of future generations); see also PUBLIC HEALTH, ETHICS, AND EQUITY
(Sudhir Anand et al. eds., 2004) (presenting the works of scholars in philosophy, anthropology,
economics, and public health to analyze ethical problems related to health inequalities among and
within populations).
10. Wikler & Brock, supra note 9, at 1.
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out of the picture altogether as subjects of moral inquiry. Rather, inquiry about
what is owed to individuals must stem in part from their circumstances as
members of populations. Likewise, inquiry about what is owed by individuals
must stem in part from their circumstances as contributors to institutional actions.
This Article focuses on the latter branch of inquiry and discusses recent and
emerging scholarship that highlights the moral obligations of affluent individuals
to the global poor, in two types of institutional roles. Part I develops the idea of a
human right to health and considers how the duties imposed by such a right could
possibly be distributed among affluent individuals in their causal role as
participants in global institutional systems. Part II addresses the obligations of
medical professionals, as affected by their institutional roles in two types of
organizations that attempt to help the global poor: humanitarian aid organizations
and not-for-profit scientific research organizations.
The unifying theme of this Article has to do with the spirit in which it makes
sense to consider our obligations to the global poor. Determining the nature and
extent of our obligations is an intellectual challenge worthy of the best minds in
moral philosophy, but it is at most only a first step toward meeting the practical
challenges of global health. Even if moral theory shows why the human rights of
the very poor require the affluent to help alleviate the global health crisis, the
truly hard problems begin with working out how to do so. How can proven
preventive and therapeutic health interventions be delivered with all due haste to
those vulnerable people who need them most urgently? How can failed health
systems be transformed into functional ones that protect people from ever
becoming so vulnerable in the first place? These problems occupy some of the
most distinguished scholars in every discipline of public health, not to mention
the world's most talented entrepreneurs and financiers. But, this Article
concludes, no amount of intellectual firepower can bring about socially enduring
solutions except through systematic efforts to include, consult, and empower the
people who actually experience the problems.
I. A HUMAN RIGHT TO HEALTH?
The idea of a human right to health expresses noble aspirations to promote
and protect health for all persons. Critics of such a right argue that no matter how
praiseworthy those aspirations may be, the attempt to act on them by insisting on
a human right to health is either misconceived or, even if well-conceived in
principle, incapable of delivering specific policy guidance beyond a minimal
starting point of simply acknowledging the right in question. Recent
philosophical advances bring fresh conceptual resources to this debate.
At the outset, we must distinguish between legal and moral conceptions of
human rights. Under the legal conception of human rights, the specification of
the content of such rights, the identification of those who hold them, and the
identification of those who bear obligations to protect or fulfill them are
determined by the actions of government entities empowered to make, enforce,
VII:2 (2007)
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and interpret the law. Under the moral conception of human rights, the content of
such rights is to be specified, and right-holders and duty-bearers are to be
identified, through analysis of moral considerations, regardless of whether any
government entities do in fact recognize them. This Article adopts the moral
conception of human rights. It presupposes, but does not argue for, a plausible
view of the relationship between the moral conception and the legal conception.
In light of the seriousness of the relevant moral considerations, together with the
minimal conditions for the moral legitimacy of government entities, the
vindication of any human right by moral considerations constitutes a strong
moral reason for government entities to recognize such a right by force of law. 1
The standard idea of a human right to health, understood as a moral right,
can be clarified by attending to its three component concepts: right, human, and
health. At the core of the idea of a human right to health is the concept of a right.
Moral philosophy contains longstanding controversies about how best to
understand the function and justification of rights.1 2 Nonetheless, there is
widespread agreement on the logical structure of rights. 13 This provides a few
anchor points for discussing the human right to health. First, if there is a human
right to health, it is what rights theorists call a claim right. Any assignment of a
claim right to one party logically entails the assignment of correlative duties to at
least one other party. That is,
A has a claim that B (p if and only if B has a duty to A to (p.14
Thus, if I have a right to health, then at least one other party must have at
least a duty not to actively harm my health, and possibly also duties to promote
and protect my health. This is an instance of the second anchor point, which is
that duties correlative to claim rights may be either negative or positive. In other
words, "y0" in the formulation above may symbolize either refraining from some
11. See generally THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 52-70 (2002) (introducing the distinction between moral and legal
conceptions of human rights and explicating the moral conception).
12. See generally Leif Wenar, Rights, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/ (outlining the main rival schools of thought on
these questions). As Wenar explains, the function of rights is a matter of what they do for the right-
holder; justification involves determining what rights there are and why we ought to respect them.
Id. § 2.
13. Id.§ 2.
14. Id. § 2.1.2 (summarizing the widely endorsed analytical framework developed in WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
(Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Yale Univ. Press 1919). Although Hohfeld, a legal theorist, developed
this framework for use in thinking about legal rights and duties, it is readily transferable to moral
rights and duties. See also Brenda Almond, Rights, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 259, 262-63 (Peter
Singer ed., 1991); Onora O'Neill, The Dark Side of Human Rights, 81 INT'L AFF. 427, 430-431
(2005) (applying the Hohfeldian logical point about the correlation between claim rights and duties
to the discussion of human rights); George W. Rainbolt, Rights Theory, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 11, 11-13
(2006), available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doilabs/10. 11 /j. 17479991.2006.00003.x.
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action (in the case of a negative duty) or performing some action (in the case of a
positive duty). 15 Negative duties correlative to a right to health would include
duties not to inflict sickness on people. 16 An example is the duty not to supply a
population with drinking water known to contain bacteria that cause cholera.
17
Correlative positive duties would include the provision of health care and of
other social goods, such as literacy, that significantly improve health outcomes.
Third, the bearers of duties correlative to rights may be either individual
persons or other kinds of agents. With respect to the idea of a right to health, a
standard assumption is that, for each right-holder, the bearer of the correlative
duties is the government of the state where the individual resides. In cases of
impoverished, ineffective, or failed states, perhaps the governments of other,
better-functioning states should be the bearers through efforts coordinated by
international agencies like the World Health Organization (WHO). '
8
There are two aspects of the moral duties that would be correlative to a right
to health: an individual aspect and a population aspect. First, each individual's
right to health would entail correlative duties to avert harms and provide services
insofar as they have a causal impact on that individual. For example, a right to
health would impose a correlative duty to provide timely treatment of an
infection from which an individual is suffering. Second, assuming every
individual member of a population has a right to health, this collective state of
affairs further entails correlative duties to avert harms and provide services
insofar as they make an impact on the health of the population. If increasing the
rate of female literacy will significantly improve health outcomes and the equity
of their distribution across the population, then the duty to promote female
15. Wenar, supra note 12, § 2.1.2. But see NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 6 (1985)
(noting that those who advocate a right to health typically regard it as entailing both positive and
negative duties: "Someone who claims a right to health ... should be understood to be claiming
that certain individuals or groups (or society as a whole) are obliged to perform certain actions
which promote or maintain his good health and are obliged to refrain from actions which interfere
with it.").
16. Another way to think about the negative duties correlated with claim rights is to use
Hohfeld's coinage "no-right," the opposite of a right. One might say that if I have a right to health,
other parties have a no-right to actively harm my health. HOHFELD, supra note 14, at 65. See also
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913). Thanks to Natalie Ram for helpful comments on
Hohfeld.
17, Cholera is an acute intestinal infection producing severe diarrhea and often vomiting.
Without treatment, victims become dehydrated so rapidly that they may die within hours of the
onset of symptoms. Cholera bacteria spread mainly through drinking water contaminated with
human feces, as a result of poor sanitation and lack of access to clean water. WORLD HEALTH ORG,,
CHOLERA, FACT SHEET No. 107 (2000), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/ fs107/en; see
also Sharon LaFraniere, In Oil-Rich Angola, Cholera Preys upon Poorest, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2006, at A1; Steven Shapin, Sick City, NEW YORKER, Nov. 6, 2006, at 110.
18. GEORGE J. ANNAS, AMERICAN BIOETHICS: CROSSING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH LAW
BOUNDARIES 21 (2005); Jonathan M. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 7, 8-10 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999).
VII:2 (2007)
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literacy is a duty both to the individual girls and women who could benefit
directly from it and to all members of the population to which they belong, male
or female.
A problem in public health ethics is that it may sometimes be necessary to
make trade-offs between duties owed to individuals directly and duties owed to
individuals qua members of the population. For example, in deciding how to
ration vaccines in the event of an influenza pandemic, one might develop a
rationing scheme based on asking which individuals have priority in their claim
to the vaccine, a question that is itself a difficult one to answer (the most
vulnerable individuals? the individuals most likely to survive? the individuals
likely to reap the greatest benefits from the investment they have already made in
their lives?). 19 But any such prior-claim scheme could be in tension with the
overarching objective of minimizing transmission throughout the population
(also operating for the ultimate benefit of its individual members), which would
dictate that those individuals most likely to transmit the virus to others should get
the vaccine first (regardless of whether they would otherwise have any prior
claim).20
Turning to the next component concept, to regard a right as a human right is
to find that each individual holds that right simply by virtue of being a person-
that is, simply because morality requires that all persons be treated in a certain
way. The right-holder's moral status as a person suffices as the moral ground of
his or her claims against bearers of the correlative duties.2' For this reason,
human rights are universal. The moral status of persons is independent of
institutional contingencies like citizenship or residence in one state or another.
For instance, an uncontroversial human right is the right not to be enslaved.22
Even where the government of a state tolerates the practice of slavery, all of its
residents nonetheless have the right not to be enslaved, simply by virtue of their
moral status as persons. Individual slaveholders violate a duty correlative to this
right-the duty not to enslave others; states that tolerate slavery violate a
correlative duty to protect all individuals from being enslaved by others. From
the standpoint of morality, agents have the duties correlative to human rights and
may be culpable for violations, whether or not they have voluntarily assumed
19. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, Who Should Get Influenza Vaccine
When Not All Can?, 312 Sci. 854 (2006) (arguing for a version of the investment scheme).
20. Whether or not there is a human right to health, this kind of trade-off remains a problem for
agencies charged with protecting and promoting the public health.
2 1. Different theories of what morality requires offer differing accounts of the specific ground
for the moral status of persons. The main alternatives are: (1) the distinctively rich and complex
capacity for well-being and suffering (based on utilitarian moral theory); and (2) the capacity for
rational agency (based on Kantian moral theory). See infra Subsection I.A. 1).
22. Unfortunately, the age-old practice of enslaving others remains alive and well in various
parts of the world. Nonetheless, the right not to be enslaved is uncontroversial, in the sense that
anyone who agrees that persons as such have moral status should straightforwardly accept the claim
that every person thereby has the right not to be enslaved.
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these duties. If there is a human right to health, any state or other party bearing
the correlative duties with respect to the members of a given population will
stand in violation of those duties if it willingly neglects them or adopts policies
contrary to their fulfillment.
The universality of human rights means that states' breaches of them cannot
be morally excused or made good by claims to political sovereignty. The
recognition of any right as a human right thus carries grave political
consequences, especially to the extent that the correlative duties lie with state
governments, because it clears a space for the principled moral justification of
external intervention (political or economic, if not military) in the domestic
affairs of sovereign states.23 This is one of the factors that perennially politicizes
and polarizes international discussions of which rights are human rights. The
question of a human right to health is a case in point.
24
The last component concept is health. Given that a claim right entails
correlative duties, and given the political consequences of recognizing any claim
right as a human right, the conception of health as the object of a human right is
bound to weigh heavily in determining precisely what the correlative duties are
and who bears them. Leading proponents of a human right to health have
typically drawn on a conception of health that is comparatively ambitious in
several respects. The preamble to the WHO Constitution defines "health"
comprehensively as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. ' 25 Even if health is
understood so broadly, it may yet come in degrees, and the preamble goes on to
declare that "[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of
the fundamental rights of every human being." 26 Furthermore, it is crucial that
the object of the declared right is health, not (only) health care. A right to health
encompasses far more than a right to health care, because the determinants of
health reach far beyond access to care.27 If there is a human right to health, its
correlative duties must be duties to address a variety of socially controllable
determinants of health, including levels of income and education.28
Critics of the idea of a human right to health address two different types of
problems: problems of conception and problems of implementation. This Part
23. That said, even when moral considerations about human rights count in favor of
intervention, there may also be moral reasons to refrain from intervention, and in particular cases
the reasons to refrain might outweigh the reasons to intervene. This form of argument is often used
by those who oppose military interventions ostensibly undertaken in the name of human rights.
24. ANNAS, supra note 18.
25. WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.who.int/governance/eb/
who constitution en.pdf.
26. Id.
27. "Only a small fraction of the variance of health status among populations can reasonably
be attributed to health care; health care is necessary but clearly not sufficient for health." Mann et
al., supra note 18, at 8.
28. Daniels, supra note 9, at 24-25.
VII:2 (2007)
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discusses each type in turn, together with some representative current efforts to
respond on behalf of the moral aspirations that typically motivate the assertion of
a human right to health.
A. Problems of Conception
Onora O'Neill presents a critique of declarations of a human right to health,
taking the WHO's declaration as a representative target. 29 Noting that a claim
right entails correlative duties, she presses the point that the right itself cannot be
defined unless its correlative duties are allocated to identifiable parties: "[W]here
anyone is to have a right there must be identifiable others (either all others or
specified others) with accurately corresponding obligations. 3 ° She accuses the
"international human rights culture" of being "often muddled or vague, or both"
about this duty-allocation problem. 31
O'Neill observes that explicit attempts to allocate the duties correlative to
human rights, as in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) of 1966, have assigned them to states that are signatories to
relevant Covenants. 32 But, as O'Neill points out, this approach to the allocation
problem fails to capture the universality of human rights, in two ways.33 First, it
confines the allocation of duties to states that voluntarily assume them, contrary
to the foundational understanding of human rights as claimable by all persons
solely by virtue of their moral status. Human rights are supposed to be rights
whose correlative duties fall to duty-bearers independently of voluntary
transactions like signing a covenant. Second, the allocation of duties only to
signatory states implies that the correlative rights themselves likewise derive
from institutions, such as international covenants: If there were no covenant, the
duties and the rights alike would be unjustifiable. In contrast, the justifiability of
human rights is supposed to be pre-institutional.
A promising answer to this line of criticism proceeds in two steps. The first
step is to identify precisely what is so morally troubling about how things stand
in global health, such that for anyone who is paying serious attention, it can make
intuitive sense to seek the global fulfillment of a human right to health. To what
state of affairs are the most vigorous practical advocates of such a right
responding, as they dedicate their work in medicine and public health to the
Herculean task of securing a right to health worldwide? The second step is to re-
examine how the conceptual resources of moral philosophy might support a
29. O'Neill, supra note 14, at 429.
30. Id. at 431.
31. Id. at 428.
32. Id. at 431. O'Neill notes that it is this Covenant from which the WHO Constitution derives
its commitment to the "highest attainable standard of physical and mental health." Id. at 429; see
also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Art.
12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16. 1966), available at http://ohchr.org/english/ law/pdf/cescr.pdf.
33. O'Neill, supra note 14, at 431-32.
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principled response to this state of affairs that is both sensitive to what is at stake
and capable of resolving conceptual worries like those articulated by O'Neill.
Thomas Pogge has summed up the answer to the first question with eloquent
rhetorical restraint. The catastrophic facts and figures speak for themselves.
Some eighteen million human beings die prematurely each year from medical
conditions we can cure-this is equivalent to fifty thousand avoidable deaths
per day, or one-third of all human deaths. Hundreds of millions more suffer
grievously from these conditions. The lives of additional hundreds of millions
are shattered by severe illnesses or premature deaths in their family.... This
huge incidence of mortality and morbidity is not randomly distributed. For a
variety of social reasons, females are significantly overrepresented among those
suffering severe ill health .... Being especially vulnerable and helpless,
children under the age of five are also overrepresented, accounting for about
two-thirds of the death toll.... But the most significant causal determinant is
poverty: Nearly all the avoidable mortality and morbidity occurs in the poor
countries.., particularly among their poorer inhabitants.
34
How might the awareness of this state of affairs motivate the intuition that there
is a human right to health? We know that ill health is the proximate cause of
avoidable death for some eighteen million people per year, about ten million of
whom are under five years of age.35 This is what makes it seem sensible to focus
on health as the content of the deficit that would, in a better world, be made
good. But why does it seem sensible to make health the object of a claim right,
which requires the allocation of correlative duties, and moreover to conceive of
that claim right as a human right, which gives rise to the problems of universality
exposed by O'Neill?
If we have reason to believe that the medical conditions in question are
treatable and preventable at a reasonably low cost, the next intuitive step is to
look for some agent or group of agents who can do something about it. A further
thought is that if there is somebody who can do something about it, especially at
comparatively little cost to themselves, then they ought to do something about
it. 36 But this line of reasoning runs into an elementary problem of moral
34. Thomas Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program, 36
METAPHILOSOPHY 182, 182-83 (2005). Pogge's text provides sources for the data cited and lists the
specific medical conditions causing preventable mortality (for example, pneumonia and other
respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, perinatal conditions, diarrhea, tuberculosis, malaria, measles,
matemal conditions, malnutrition, sexually transmitted diseases, meningitis, and hepatitis) and
morbidity (for example, all of the above, plus dengue fever, leprosy, sleeping sickness, river
blindness, leishmaniasis, lymphatic filariasis, and schistosomiasis).
35. Robert E. Black et al., Where and Why Are 10 Million Children Dying Every Year?, 361
LANCET 2226 (2003).
36. See Jennifer Bryce et al., Can the World Afford To Save the Lives of 6 Million Children
Each Year?, 365 LANCET 2193 (2005); Gareth Jones et al., How Many Child Deaths Can We
Prevent This Year?, 362 LANCET 65 (2003).
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philosophy: Under what conditions do we owe a duty of assistance to others, as
contrasted with the duty not to harm them?
This problem is one of a broad class of problems collected under various
labels: action versus omission; killing versus letting die; doing harm versus
allowing harm. 37 The contested issue about duty is whether to mark a morally
important distinction between different types of causal role that an agent's
behavior might play in the occurrence of bad consequences. Some conceptions of
morality focus only on the badness of the consequences, so that what matters is
simply whether an agent might have produced different consequences by
behaving differently. 38 On this view, non-helping by omission can be as serious a
39wrong as active harming, provided the consequences in each case are the same.
Other conceptions of morality insist on a morally important distinction between
different kinds of contribution that an agent might make to the occurrence of a
harm. In one representative version, we look for the agent's "most direct
contribution" to the harm and ask whether that contribution is an action or an
omission (for example, "pushing the head under water or refraining from
throwing a life preserver").4 °
A quarter-century ago, philosopher Philippa Foot expressed her version of
the latter view as follows:
Most of us allow people to die of starvation in India and Africa, and there is
surely something wrong with us that we do it; it would be nonsense, however,
to pretend that it is only in law that we make the distinction between allowing
people in the underdeveloped countries to die of starvation and sending them
poisoned food. There is worked into our moral system a distinction between
what we owe people in the form of aid and what we owe them in the way of
non-interference. 4
1
Let us bracket the question of whether affluent individuals only "allow" the
harms suffered by the global poor or whether we are culpably implicated in
active harming, not by any action so overtly hostile as sending poisoned food, but
rather by other actions of routinely accepting, participating in, and benefiting
from the institutions that regulate global trade, labor, finance, and other features
in the background of severe chronic poverty.42 Suppose it is only a matter of
37. For a helpful overview, see Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2002).
38. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 6, at 231 (providing a famous example).
39. Id. at 235.
40. Howard-Snyder, supra note 37 (discussing Warren Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 PHIL. REV. 287 (1989)).
41. PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 26-27 (1981). For selecting this quotation and locating
it the context of the present discussion, credit is due to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 3 J. MORAL
PHIL. 97, 97 (2006) (reviewing POGGE, supra note 11).
42. Making the case for the claim that we actively harm the global poor is the aim of Pogge.
POGGE, supra note 11. For an excellent debate on this issue, see Mathias Risse, Do We Owe the
11
Merritt: Bioethics, Philosophy, and Global Health
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
allowing the global poor to suffer harm. (Figuratively, suppose that what we are
doing is more like refraining from throwing life buoys, and less like pushing
people's heads under water.) Are we thereby neglecting a duty to give
assistance? More to the point, even if we have a duty to give assistance, is it the
kind of duty that we have because it correlates with the human rights of others?
(If so, "our" moral system should be revised to acknowledge it.) Finally, even if
the answer to both these questions is yes, how is it possible to allocate to several
billion affluent individuals the duties that correlate with the claim rights of one to
two billion impoverished individuals?
43
Here is where recent philosophical advances in thinking about human rights
can offer at least a partial solution. Elizabeth Ashford, a philosopher, has recently
proposed a novel conception of the human right to basic necessities. 44 While this
is not the same as a human right to health, the object of a human right to basic
necessities would include secure access to certain crucial determinants of health,
such as clean water, sanitation, and adequate nutrition, as well as to basic health
care. In addition to this overlap in content, the two rights have a similar logical
structure: A human right to basic necessities would entail both negative and
positive correlative duties, similar to the examples mentioned above in
connection with the idea of a human right to health. Since the claim that human
rights give rise to negative duties is comparatively uncontroversial, the
discussion of Ashford's work that follows will focus on her arguments about
positive duties. 45 Addressing the question of who owes how much to whom,
Ashford argues that the two dominant philosophical accounts of the moral status
of persons, utilitarianism and Kantianism (both to be outlined below), converge
Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 9 (2005), and Thomas Pogge,
Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 55 (2005). See also
Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 349 (2005). For
general analysis of relevant conceptions of personal responsibility, see Samuel Scheffler, Individual
Responsibility in a Global Age, in SCHEFFLER, supra note 6.
43. "One in five people in the world-more than 1 billion people-still survive on less than $1
a day, a level of poverty so abject that it threatens survival. Another 1.5 billion people live on $1-2
a day. More than 40% of the world's population constitute, in effect, a global underclass, faced
daily with the reality or the threat of extreme poverty." UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AT A CROSSROADS: AID,
TRADE AND SECURITY IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 24 (2005), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf. Existence in extreme poverty
burdens more than 850 million of these people---"including one in three preschool children"--with
chronic malnutrition; more than 1 billion of them with no access to safe water; and approximately
2.6 billion of them with no access to improved sanitation. Id.
44. Elizabeth Ashford, The Duties Imposed by the Human Right to Basic Necessities, in
FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT: WHO OWES WHAT TO THE VERY POOR? (Thomas
Pogge ed., forthcoming July 2007) (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
45. As Ashford articulates the distinction, negative duties are duties "to forbear from initiating
a threatening causal sequence of events" (such as actively supplying the population with water
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in their implications for a human right to basic necessities-and this is so despite
the fact that they represent systematically opposing conceptual frameworks in
moral philosophy.46 They both reasonably impose "positive duties to secure
persons' access to basic necessities," and these positive duties are "sufficiently
morally urgent to constitute human rights claims."47
A selective reconstruction of Ashford's argument for this position will help
to explicate the idea of a human right to basic necessities and its potential for
addressing the duty-allocation problem. Let us begin with an overview. As
Ashford notes, the justification of any human right has two parts. The first part is
to show that its object has such fundamental moral importance as to be owed to
all persons simply by virtue of their moral status.48 The second part is to show
"that the duties generated by the right can reasonably be imposed on agents,"
since a human right is a claim-right logically correlated with duties.49 Moreover,
the duties whose imposition on agents must be shown to be reasonable will take a
particular form: they are duties of justice, in the sense that human rights entitle
right-holders to make moral claims on duty-bearers. This is in contrast with
duties of benevolence, also known as humanitarian duties or duties of charity,
which do not entitle would-be recipients of aid to make moral claims on would-
be benefactors.5°
Finally, Ashford rejects the assumption that, in order to allocate the duties
correlative to human rights, it must be possible in every instance to "match up"
individual right-claimants with "specific addressees.' Instead, in the case of a
human right to basic necessities, right-holders can justifiably make moral claims
not only against institutional agents such as their own governments, but also
against all affluent individuals, because the condition of affluence itself puts one
in a causal position to help alleviate severe chronic poverty. Moral responsibility
is distributed among the affluent, in ways that make sense in light of the actions
that we are typically able to perform as private individuals. This distribution of
responsibility does not require anything like the manifestly impossible process of
tracing actual causal links-through complex global systems of trade, labor,
finance, politics, climate, and so on-between specifiable affluent individuals
and specifiable individuals suffering from severe chronic poverty. Instead, the
upshot is simply that each affluent individual has certain positive duties to do at
least his or her fair share in supporting effective aid and pressing for institutional
reform. 52
46. Id. (manuscript at 1).
47. Id (manuscript at 6).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (manuscript at 27).
51. Id. (manuscript at 32).
52. Id. (manuscript at 32-33).
13
Merritt: Bioethics, Philosophy, and Global Health
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2007
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
1. The Moral Status of Persons and the Importance of Basic Necessities
Ashford's starting point is the assumption that underlies the claim that there
are such things as human rights: "[T]hat each person without exception has moral
status and can therefore justifiably demand not to be treated in ways that are
fundamentally incompatible with that moral status. 53 The two dominant
philosophical accounts of the moral status of persons are found in utilitarianism
and Kantianism.
Utilitarianism, in its classic formulation, defines right action as the
maximization of well-being (technically "utility," also known as "welfare"), as
assessed from an impartial perspective that encompasses all persons and all
sentient beings. The maximization of well-being requires, among other things,
the alleviation of suffering. Utilitarianism has many variants emphasizing
different accounts of the good(s) that ought to be maximized and, consequently,
emphasizing different aspects of the moral importance of personhood. A
centrally influential version of utilitarianism grounds the moral status of persons
in the richness and complexity of our capacity for both well-being and
suffering. 54 It is this version of utilitarianism that Ashford deals with in her
discussion of human rights. 5
The label "Kantianism" indicates an approach to moral theory rooted in the
legacy of Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kantian
theories ground the moral status of persons in the capacity for autonomous
rational agency; roughly, the capacity to make one's own choices about what to
do.56 This is in contrast to being manipulated or pushed around like a mere
object, whether by the actions of others or by the compulsion of one's own unmet
needs (such as hunger, thirst, pain, illness). Perhaps the most culturally
influential Kantian expression of the criterion of right action, and the one most
closely associated with human rights discourse, is one of Kant's own
formulations: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never
simply as a means. 57 In more colloquial terms, Kantian moral theory demands
that we act always according to principles that respect and support the dignity of
persons (ourselves and others), in particular the capacity to choose one's own
53. Id. (manuscript at 2).
54. Roger Crisp & Tim Chappell, Utilitarianism, in CONCISE ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 909, 909 (2000); see also J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1861)
(introducing a classic foundation for the philosophical tradition that informs the version of
utilitarianism most relevant to this article).
55. Ashford, supra note 44 (manuscript at 3).
56. See generally Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kantian Normative Ethics, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK
OF ETHICAL THEORY 480 (David Copp ed., 2006) (surveying Kantian moral philosophy).
57. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 229-230 (Thomas E.
Hill, Jr. & Arnulf Zweig trans. & eds., 2002) (1785).
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actions. 58
To establish that basic necessities have fundamental importance by the
standards of both utilitarian and Kantian accounts of the moral status of persons,
one needs to show that without secure access to basic necessities-such as
sanitation, clean drinking water, adequate nourishment, and the level of medical
care necessary for survival plus some decent modicum of health-people are
condemned to suffering and deprived of well-being or indeed of life itself, and
that they are also deprived of meaningful agency. For a clear appreciation of
these points, we have only to consider the horrendous quality of existence
suffered by the very poor. Ashford presents it as follows:
When people lack secure access to basic necessities their lives are drastically
impoverished and stunted. Chronic poverty imposes very severe restrictions on
the range of options they can pursue. It may undermine their most central goals
and commitments that are absolutely integral to their ability to live out their
conception of a decent life, such as their goal of raising flourishing children if,
for example, they are unable to provide their children with the food or basic
medical care they need for health or even survival. Malnutrition can cause
chronic lethargy, which restricts persons' ability to pursue any activity. It can
moreover cause brain damage and so permanently impair persons' rational
autonomous faculties, and it can cause other permanent debilities. It can also
cause extreme physical pain (from hunger or disease) and mental pain (through
the preventable death of several close family members, for example). Lack of
basic necessities can therefore preclude a minimally decent and autonomous
life. 
59
To some extent, it is the very experience of chronic insecurity about access
to necessities like water, sanitation, and food (in addition to the absence of these
necessities themselves) that also precludes meaningful agency. Not only does
such insecurity curtail one's most basic options for choosing what to do; it also
goes hand in hand with abject humiliation. Life on the edge of survival is felt by
the very poor as a constant assault on their dignity.6 ° In sum, from the utilitarian
viewpoint, secure access to basic necessities is indispensable for well-being;
58. Hill, supra note 56, at 489 (offering the following gloss on Kant's formulation: "To value
rational persons as ends, we must not use them for ends that, in some sense, they cannot share....
Kant adds that persons, conceived as members of a kingdom of ends, have a dignity, which is
grounded in their autonomy of will. . . . Dignity is an 'unconditional and incomparable worth,'
above all price and 'without equivalent.' Thus dignity is a value that is independent of a person's
social status and utility."). For a sustained discussion of Kantian moral theory and human rights,
see James Griffin, Discrepancies Between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the
International Law of Human Rights, 101 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1 (2001).
59. Ashford, supra note 44. (manuscript at 6-7). See generally Keith P. West, Jr. et al.,
Nutrition, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 2, at 187 (surveying scientific literature
on food security, population spectrum of nutritional status, undernutrition, micronutrient
deficiencies, diet and undermutrition, malnutrition among older persons, and more).
60. See DEEPA NARAYAN ET AL., VOICES OF THE POOR: CAN ANYONE HEAR US? (2000).
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likewise, from the Kantian viewpoint, it is essential to sustaining meaningful
agency.
2. Positive Duties Correlative to a Human Right to Basic Necessities
The greater philosophical challenge is to make the case for the
reasonableness of the positive duties that a human right to basic necessities
would impose upon agents. Starting with utilitarianism, Ashford reminds us that
because it is concerned with occurrences of suffering or well-being, whether or
not they result from a given agent actively introducing them into the world, it
makes no intrinsic distinction between that agent's allowing harm (e.g., failing to
relieve famine) and causing harm (e.g., sending poisoned food), supposing the
consequences are identical. If omissions may have the same consequences for
suffering and well-being as would active harms, then rights should protect right-
holders against omissions as much as against active harms.
61
But this is not yet the whole story. Since utilitarianism defines right action
from a viewpoint that is impartial across persons, a utilitarian analysis of human
rights must accommodate the prospect of interpersonal trade-offs. Some states of
affairs, such as secure access to basic necessities, are so important for a person's
well-being that for purposes of measurement and interpersonal comparison, we
should arguably register a discontinuity in the scale of value, so that "one
person's human right could never be outweighed by any number of others' trivial
interests." 62 For instance, suppose that the choices of one thousand people to eat
as much beef as they want for dinner every night for a year adds up to a quantity
of aggregate pleasure that would, on a strictly continuous scale, cancel out the
suffering that one severely and chronically malnourished person would endure,
over the same time period, as a result of agricultural policies that divert a
population's grain supply to the feeding of beef cattle for export. The fact that
severe chronic malnourishment undercuts one's very capacity to experience well-
being at all counts in favor of stipulating a discontinuity in the scale, so that such
pervasive suffering on the part of any person cannot be "cancelled out" by any
quantity of trivial pleasures enjoyed by others. At the same time, utilitarian
analysis must continue to register the possibility that "the basic interests
protected by human rights could be outweighed by the comparably serious
interests of several others. 63 This means that, for utilitarianism, the importance
of the interests that a putative human right would protect must be weighed
against the cost to others of protecting those interests. Accordingly, "[t]he
question of what human rights there are will be determined by examining how
much sacrifice would be required from how many for the sake of how much gain
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for how many."6 4
What it would actually take to eradicate severe chronic poverty, and what it
would cost, are questions that lead beyond the scope of this Article.6 5 The point
of principle is that insofar as the cost of securing basic necessities for the poor
could be distributed among the affluent without threatening any comparably
significant interests of ours, it is entirely reasonable to recognize a human right
(to basic necessities) whose correlative duties would impose that level of cost
upon the affluent. This point of principle leaves open the question of effective
and feasible means. It cannot by itself determine which solutions will work, and
in particular it does not privilege simple donation or massive wealth transfer over
context-sensitive programs that might include better governance, the
establishment and enforcement of universal property rights under the rule of law,
economic growth, market-based mechanisms like for-profit microfinance, or
pricing schemes that would protect supplies of potable water better than wasteful
giveaways.66 The point is only that whatever the cost of eradicating poverty
might be, through whatever means are effective and feasible, it is reasonable to
impose that cost on the affluent insofar as it threatens no comparably significant
interests of ours.
Ashford's utilitarian argument for a human right to basic necessities is
reminiscent of a principle famously articulated in 1972 by the utilitarian
philosopher Peter Singer, also in the context of challenging the complacency of
the affluent toward global poverty: "If it is in our power to prevent something
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
importance, we ought, morally, to do it."67 While Ashford's analysis
substantially extends and fleshes out the line of thought earlier opened by Singer,
her most striking innovation is her Kantian argument for the claim that a human
right to basic necessities reasonably imposes positive duties upon agents.
Ashford's Kantian argument draws on the model of Kantian contractualism
developed by T.M. Scanlon.6 s Contractualism is a method for the moral
64. Id.
65. For a recent estimate, drawing on the latest figures compiled by the United Nations and
showing that the eradication of severe chronic poverty is easily within the financial reach of the
world's affluent in aggregate, see Peter Singer, What Should a Billionaire Give-and What Should
You?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 58. For other examples of steps in this
direction, see Thomas W. Pogge, Eradicating Systematic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources
Dividend, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 59 (2001); Gopal Sreenivasan, International Justice and Health: A
Proposal, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 81, 83 (2002).
66. For discussion of related issues in the provision of water and sanitation, see UNITED
NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER,
POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/
pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf.
67. Singer, supra note 6, at 231. Singer updates the application of this principle to the present-
day global situation in Singer, supra note 65.
68. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998); Elizabeth Ashford, The
Demandingness of Scanlon 's Contractualism, 113 ETHICS 273 (2003).
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assessment of proposed principles to regulate individual or institutional conduct.
In brief, it works by specifying a set of hypothetical conditions and asking what
principles it would be reasonable for parties to accept, or what it would not be
reasonable for them to reject, under those conditions. Kantian contractualism
grounds the acceptability of principles in the requirement of equal respect for
each party as a rational autonomous agent. This means that the acceptability of a
proposed principle depends on whether each affected individual, from a position
of equal moral standing, could reasonably agree to it. Recognizing the equal and
fundamental moral importance of each individual nevertheless allows for
comparison between the strengths of different individuals' reasons for accepting
or rejecting a principle.69
Consider the proposed principle that affluent agents have a duty to help the
victims of severe chronic poverty to gain secure access to basic necessities, when
they can do so without significant cost to themselves. Clearly, each poor
individual's reasons for accepting this principle are stronger than any reason an
affluent individual might give for rejecting it. Thus, the affluent have some duty
to aid the poor. The important question, Ashford argues, is "whether this duty of
aid should be seen as a duty of benevolence or as a duty of basic justice to which
the chronically poor are entitled as a human right."' 70 The interestingly
controversial comparison, then, is between two candidate principles for
specifying the nature of the duty to give assistance. The principle specifying it as
a duty of benevolence would be something like, each affluent agent has a duty to
help some chronically poor individuals some of the time. The rival principle
specifying it as a duty of basic justice would be something like, each affluent
agent has a duty to do his or her fair share to secure every chronically poor
71individual's access to basic necessities.
Consider what it would be like for affected individuals to accept the
principle specifying the duty to give aid as a duty of benevolence. For any given
poor individual, helping that person would be "morally optional"; no particular
poor individual could claim any entitlement to basic necessities.72 By contrast,
the duty-of-basic-justice specification entitles every poor individual to make
claims on affluent agents, at least in the aggregate, which in practice translates
into claims on the governments of affluent states and the international institutions
in which affluent states participate. On this specification, no poor individual's
lack of secure access to basic necessities can be permissibly excluded from
69. Ashford, supra note 44 (manuscript at 4).
70. Id. (manuscript at 26). A duty of "basic justice" here is a pre-institutional or extra-
institutional duty. That is, its moral force does not require that the parties involved be related
through any social institutions; to the contrary, it serves as a criterion of justice for the critical
examination of social institutions. In particular, the duties correlative to human rights are duties of
basic justice, in virtue of the universality that is part of the concept of a human right.
71. My formulation of the principles to be compared is meant to summarize Ashford's more




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol7/iss2/2
BIOETHICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND GLOBAL HEALTH
consideration on the grounds that helping that individual is "morally optional. 73
Each poor individual thus has strong reasons for rejecting the duty-of-
benevolence specification in favor of the duty-of-basic-justice specification. And
given what is at stake for severely impoverished individuals, as in the case of the
principle that acknowledges the duty to assistance in the first place, each poor
individual's reasons are far stronger than the opposing reasons that any affluent
individual could present.74
In addition, Ashford argues that affluent individuals have compelling
reasons of their own to prefer that the duty to aid be specified as a duty of basic
justice rather than as a duty of benevolence.75 The full comparative argument
between the two candidate specifications, as they would affect affluent
individuals, is too complex to summarize here. The main point is that a duty of
basic justice would underwrite a system of enforceable compliance, fairly
distributing the burdens of giving aid across all affluent individuals, so that each
individual would be required to give no more than his or her fair share. But even
if we leave aside this strand of the argument, the prior point is that the affluent
cannot reasonably reject the claims of each poor individual to being treated with
respect for their agency, specifically in the form of securing their access to basic
necessities-the material prerequisites of meaningful agency-where doing so
would burden affluent individuals very little. This point suffices to vindicate a
construal of the duty to aid as one owed by right to each individual person in
severe chronic poverty.
3. Duty Allocation
We are now in a position to revisit the duty-allocation problem that troubles
O'Neill in her criticism of the human right to health. The implication Ashford
draws from her argument for a human right to basic necessities is that the
correlative duties are shared by all affluent individuals. She acknowledges that,
as a matter of fact, only entities on the order of national governments and global
institutions are typically able to command the economic resources and political
clout necessary to address the root causes of chronic severe poverty.76
Nonetheless, even if the complex set of background conditions affecting the
global poor is dominated by institutional actors, individuals remain responsible
for their actions and omissions with respect to influencing how these actors
operate. Affluent individuals hold positions of non-negligible power within the
global order, so that their positive duties include pressing for reform of the
institutions whose activities determine the background conditions so pervasively.
Exceptionally influential individuals, by collaborating with governments and
73. Id.
74. Id. (manuscript at 28).
75. Id.
76. Id. (manuscript at 7).
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global institutions to transform their modus operandi, can make significant
progress in altering the global order on behalf of the poor. For example, in the
words of a Time article naming the rock star Bono a 2005 Person of the Year
along with Bill and Melinda Gates, "Bono charmed and bullied and morally
blackmailed the leaders of the world's richest countries into forgiving $40 billion
in debt owed by the poorest; now those countries can spend the money on health
and schools rather than interest payments-and have no more excuses for not
doing so."' 77 And since 1986, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife
Rosalynn have worked with WHO and others in an effort to eradicate neglected
diseases, such as Guinea worm disease, trachoma, river blindness,
schistosomiasis, and lymphatic filariasis, which are suffered exclusively by
hundreds of millions of the poorest and most dispossessed people in the world. 78
The positive duties of ordinary individuals include contributing at least their
fair share of resources to an effective aid or development agency. 79 In addition, if
Ashford's arguments succeed, individuals ought to supplement donations with
efforts to promote institutional reform in order to sustain a morally adequate
response, both to the utilitarian requirement to take responsibility for the
important consequences of one's actions and omissions and to the Kantian
contractualist principle specifying the duty to give assistance (up to the point of
securing access to basic necessities) as a duty of basic justice.
Even individuals who lack the public visibility of rock stars and former
presidents can exert remarkable leverage in transforming global institutions. A
recent success story is the development of a new market mechanism, the
Advance Market Commitment (AMC). The AMC guarantees that a market will
exist for new vaccines designed to avert the leading causes of child mortality
among the poorest populations, who would otherwise be unable to pay for them.
The goal is to encourage manufacturers to produce such vaccines sooner and
more cheaply than would otherwise be feasible, and to reimburse resource-
challenged national governments for distributing them to the poor. The pilot
AMC project, funded at $1.5 billion, aims eventually to vaccinate seventy million
to one hundred million children against pneumococcal disease, which now causes
approximately one million child deaths per year. 80 While it takes powerful
77. Nancy Gibbs, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 26, 2005, at 38.
78. Nicholas Kristof, Torture by Worms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at A13. The Carter Center
pursues its health programs explicitly under the banner of good health as "a basic human right."
The Carter Center, http://www.cartercenter.org/health/index.html (last visited May 3, 2007). See
also Alan Fenwick, Waterborne Infectious Diseases-Could They Be Consigned to History? 25
Sci. 1077, 1078 (detailing "the joint efforts of the Carter Center and WHO" toward the eradication
of Guinea worm disease).
79. Peter Singer has estimated that donating one percent of one's annual income toward
overcoming world poverty is "the minimum that one must do to lead a morally decent life." PETER
SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 194 (2d ed. 2002). For a proposal about
reasonable levels of donation stratified by income, see Singer, supra note 65.
80. Andrew Cole, Governments Unite to Fund Vaccine for Poor Countries, 334 BMJ 29
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institutional actors to finance and execute such a project (in the case of
pneumococcal vaccine, these are Italy, the U.K., Norway, Russia, Canada, and
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), it is only through the day-to-day efforts
of individual scientists and policy analysts that such schemes actually come to
exist. Far from being pop icons, the people who work behind the scenes are more
like the colleagues you might routinely meet in your office corridor.
81
To the extent that a human right to basic necessities does require that
correlative duties be delegated to states and global institutions, much work
remains to be done toward specifying the details. 82 But on Ashford's account,
this does not have the paradoxical consequence of pairing a supposedly universal
right with duties borne only by the self-selected group of institutional actors that
volunteer to take them on. Rather, the universal right is paired with duties borne
primarily by all affluent individuals as a non-optional matter of what morality
requires and only derivatively by the institutional actors necessary to carry out
those moral duties effectively. Ashford's argument can deliver this result because
it confers the status of human right only upon object-based claim-rights that
satisfy two conditions. First, the lack of the object makes even the most minimal
degree of well-being and meaningful agency untenable. Second, the means to
secure the object could be provided by other individuals (the affluent), regarded
in aggregate, without significant loss in well-being or meaningful agency for
anyone, so that to accept a state of affairs in which some (not to say a billion or
two) individuals suffer this lack is to deny their moral status as persons. Secure
access to basic necessities meets both of these conditions.
Arguably, those two conditions are not satisfied by the WHO Constitution's
more ambitious understanding of health as the object of a human right: "a state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being" enjoyed at the "highest
attainable standard., 83 Indeed, it proves challenging enough to argue for basic
necessities (including basic health care and adequate provision of other
determinants of health) as the object of a human right correlated with positive
duties to give assistance. 84 Establishing the universality and morally well-
founded enforceability of any such right-that is, giving it teeth as a human
right-requires careful calibration in the conception of its object. Pruning back
the currently expansive conception of health as the object of the right may well
be the price of developing a solution to the duty-allocation problem.
At the same time, we should preserve a sharp distinction between brute
(2007); New Vaccines for Old Killers, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2007, at 62.
81. See, e.g., Orin Levine & Michael J. Klag, Vaccines for the Vulnerable Around the World,
BALT. SUN, Jan. 3, 2007, at 11A (providing commentary by two public health scientists closely
involved in advocacy for the pneumococcal AMC).
82. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Matthew DeCamp, Responsibility for Global Health, 27
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 95 (2006).
83. WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.who.int/govemance/eb/
who constitutionen.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Ashford, supra note 44.
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political feasibility and the calibration of morally principled limits on duty-
bearers' burdens.85 For any putative human right, on both the utilitarian model
and the Kantian contractualist model, specifying the content of the right's object
O requires asking what burdens would be imposed on duty-bearers D by the
protection of morally fundamental O-related benefits for right-holders R. On the
utilitarian model, the theoretical limit is reached at the point where the burdens
on D would threaten any of D's interests in well-being in ways that are
comparable in gravity to the morally fundamental O-related aspects of R's well-
being. On the Kantian model, the theoretical limit is reached at the point where
the burdens on D would make it reasonable, on grounds of respect for D's
agency, for D to reject any principle requiring D to assume those burdens. In
real-world attempts to specify the content of health-related human rights, the
application of either or both of these models leaves as an open question precisely
how expansive the operative conception of "health" should be. Regarding
affluent individuals and poor individuals, respectively, in global aggregate, one
might think that demands on the affluent could be greatly stepped up before we
would reach either the utilitarian or the Kantian theoretical limit.
Nevertheless, in the countries and cities where the global poor live, suffer,
and die in greatest numbers, health systems and other determinants of health
present fiendishly complex problems that either cannot be solved simply by an
influx of resources or, even if they could be, must in the meantime be addressed
in the absence of adequate resources. 86 As described below, realities that are far
from ideal may affect the specific entitlements that people can claim in the name
of their health-related rights.
87
B. Problems of Implementation
Critics who focus on problems of implementation are, for the most part,
sympathetic to the spirit in which advocates of a human right to health assert
such a right. Their critical concerns have to do with the daunting conceptual and
political complexity of determining how to secure any such right in real-world
settings.
Norman Daniels argues that so far as states bear duties to secure the health-
related rights of their individual citizens, even if these rights are construed as
human rights and thus as universal, the claims that individual right-holders can
thereby make on their state for specific goods and services will be in practice
85. Thanks to Chad Flanders for his illuminating comments on this issue.
86. For an exemplary overview of some key problems, see Lynn P. Freedman et al.,
Transforming Health Systems To Improve the Lives of Women and Children, 365 LANCET 997
(2005); Lant Pritchett & Michael Woolcock, Solutions When the Solution Is the Problem: Arraying
the Disarray in Development, 32 WORLD DEV. 191 (2004).
87. John D. Arras & Elizabeth Fenton, Bioethics and Human Rights: Curb Your Enthusiasm,
33 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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relative to that state's available resources. Limited resource-availability means
that states will need to set priorities in allocating resources toward the realization
of health-related rights. The upshot is that regardless of whether foundational
philosophical arguments can establish the universality of health-related rights,
states will nevertheless, in the attempt to realize them, confront several classic
"unsolved rationing problems." 88
Undoubtedly, such problems are inevitable when states must set priorities
for the allocation of limited resources. And a fair deliberative process, as
developed for instance by Daniels in the form of "accountability for
reasonableness," presents a philosophically well-grounded and practically viable
approach to the problems of priority-setting. 89 But there is still room in this
picture for differences to be made by foundational arguments for the universality
of certain health-related rights.
One potential difference is in the severity of the limitation on a state's
available resources that affluent global on-lookers can accept, compatible with
recognizing the moral status of each individual person. If there is a human right
to basic necessities, and basic health care is by definition a basic necessity, then
there is a human right to basic health care. But how are we to understand "basic
health care?" A powerful criterion is available in the form of Ashford's argument
that the object of any universal claim-right is specified jointly by (a) the
importance of what each right-holder stands to lose and (b) the reasonableness of
requiring each duty-bearer to contribute their fair share to the protection of right-
holders against that loss. So, if some citizens of a given state suffer levels of
morbidity and mortality that (a) subvert any prospect of well-being or meaningful
agency and (b) could be avoided by health care measures or public health
measures (water, sanitation) deliverable at little cost, yet the state's available
resources are so meager as to be unable to support delivery of even these
relatively cheap measures, then affluent agents in the rest of the world have
duties of basic justice to make good on the deficit.90 A universal right to basic
health care would thus establish a limit on the severity of priority-setting
88. Daniels, supra note 9, at 23-24; see Norman Daniels, Just Health (manuscript on file with
author).
89. NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN To SHARE
MEDICAL RESOURCES? 43 (2002). Because reasonable disagreement about priority-setting is to be
expected, the process used to reach decisions must be one that even those who lose out can accept
as legitimate. This requires that justifying reasons be both transparent and rationally defensible to
all parties, whether or not they benefit from the decisions reached. Daniels and colleagues also
include accountability for reasonableness in a set of "benchmarks for fairness" developed as a
policy tool for health care reform. Norman Daniels et al., An Evidence-Based Approach to
Benchmarking the Fairness of Health-Sector Reform in Developing Countries, 83 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 534 (2005); Norman Daniels et al., Benchmarks of Fairness for Health Care Reform:
A Policy Tool for Developing Countries, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 740, 745-746 (2000).
90. Elizabeth Ashford, Lecturer in Moral Philosophy, Univ. of St. Andrews, Scot., Comments
on Presentation by Norman Daniels at Harvard University Conference on Equality and the New
Global Order (May 13, 2006).
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problems that a state should have to face.
The 2005 Montreal Statement on the Human Right to Essential Medicines
provides a template for recognizing and implementing a human right to basic
health care. 91 The Statement's first point establishes the importance of what is at
stake for people who lack essential medicines-"Two billion people lack access
to essential medicines. This deprivation causes immense suffering: pain, fear,
loss of dignity and life. Forty-thousand people die daily as a result, the vast
majority of them children under five years old.",
92
Points (2) and (3) make the case for the reasonableness of requiring affluent
agents to protect the global poor against the deprivation of essential medicines:
Poor people lack access to essential medicines because research and
development do not address their priority health needs, because health systems
are inadequate, and because existing medicines are unaffordable to them....
Existing policies, rules, and institutions foreseeably give rise to deprivations on
a massive scale. Alternative designs are feasible; reforms are urgently
required.... At a minimum, trade agreements, intellectual property laws, loans,
aid, and other international arrangements as well as national institutions, laws,
and policies must be designed so as to avoid violation of this right. 
93
Point (4) attributes to states a "core obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill
the right to essential medicines" for their own populations, an obligation that
"requires immediate and effective measures and is not subject to progressive
implementation., 94 This rules out priority-setting choices that would deprive a
state's citizens of essential medicines if the state has the resources to supply
them. Accordingly, "[t]he human right to essential medicines requires that
national health systems guarantee at all times that the population receive all
essential medicines in adequate amounts, of assured quality, at the appropriate
time and in the appropriate dosage ... at a price the individual and the
community can afford." 95 In addition, taking a human right to essential
medicines seriously commits outsiders to ensuring that states have the resources
to supply them. 96
91. The Montreal Statement is the result of a workshop held in 2005 by individuals
representing NGOs, governments, international agencies, and academia. See Thomas Pogge,
Montreal Statement on the Human Right to Essential Medicines, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 97, 104-07 (2007) (reprinting the Montreal Statement). Credit is due to John Arras for
pointing out that essential medicines are a powerful example of how to understand "basic health
care." Arras & Fenton, supra note 87, at 34.
92. POGGE, supra note 91, at 104.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Montreal Statement limits its explicit attribution of this obligation to state
signatories to international human-rights treaties. But if there is a human right to basic necessities,
including essential medicines, then every capable state has the same obligation.
95. Id. at 105.
96. Does it also commit outsiders to intervening in states that have the resources but still
neglect their population's basic needs? Non-governmental aid organizations often take the liberty
VII:2 (2007)
24
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol7/iss2/2
BIOETHICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND GLOBAL HEALTH
The responsibility of governments for the fulfillment of human rights
includes international assistance and cooperation. "Affluent countries must,
therefore, ensure fairer trade and investment, eliminate crippling debt, and
contribute equitably to international assistance aimed at facilitating the full
realization of the right to essential medicines. 97
Moreover, the Montreal Statement (Point 5) pegs its conception of "essential
medicines" to the WHO's Essential Drugs List. 98 Which medicines count as
essential is to be specified by reference to "the priority health care needs of the
population, in light of their public health relevance, proven quality, efficacy and
safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness. 9 9
But not all worries about the implementation of health-related human rights
can be addressed by focusing primarily on specific health care interventions like
access to essential medicines. For one thing, even those efforts must be anchored
in health system reform, as noted in the Montreal Statement's Point 7. In
practice, the reform of national health systems must take place in a local or
regional context of broadly problematic political, economic, and institutional
circumstances. 100 In addition, the successful uptake of medical interventions that
health systems might attempt to make available is often inextricable from
complex cultural factors. For instance, suppose that a key risk factor in children's
death from diarrhea is whether women have the effective freedom to take
children to the doctor, even when a male relative is not available or willing to
accompany them. More generally, preventive and therapeutic interventions based
on biomedical science may compete for cultural uptake with long-entrenched
belief systems that attribute illness to supernatural or other non-biomedical
causes. 10 1 Simply making material resources available may be of little, if any,
help. In order to make serious headway, greater availability of material resources
must be supplemented with research into the operations of health systems in
order to identify and study context-specific obstacles to the population-wide
delivery of proven interventions. 102
The global AIDS epidemic exemplifies, on a larger scale, the danger of
of intervening in such cases. Here is one plausible view. As with civil and political rights, so too
with socio-economic rights: a state's violation of human rights counts as one reason in favor of
intervening, but this reason may in particular cases be outweighed by other reasons, including
moral reasons, against intervening; or some specific forms of intervention may be ruled out by the
countervailing reasons, while others may be permitted.
97. POGGE, supra note 91, at 106.
98. Id. at 105. For WHO's Essential Drugs List, see WORLD HEALTH ORG., ESSENTIAL
MEDICINES: WHO MODEL LIST (14th ed. 2005), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2005/
a87017_eng.pdf.
99. POGGE, supra note 91, at 105.
100. Phyllida Travis et al., Overcoming Health-Systems Constraints To Achieve the Millennium
Development Goals, 364 LANCET 900, 901-02 (2004).
101. Susan C. Scrimshaw, Culture, Behavior, and Health, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH,
supra note 2, at 43, 47.
102. Travis et al., supra note 100, at 903-04.
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associating health-related human rights too closely with an imperative to make
treatment interventions available. Daniels points out that in the late 1990s,
advocates of human rights appealed to a form of a right to health, in particular a
right to health care, in order to derive a universal right specifically to
antiretroviral medication for AIDS. As a result, treatment was prioritized over
prevention in the global response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, even though re-
directing at least some efforts toward prevention might have saved more lives at
lower cost over time. 103
Arguably, this was a case of misidentifying, through over-specification, the
object of the relevant health-related right in the attempt at implementation.
Whatever is supposed to be protected by health-related rights, prevention and
treatment might both contribute comparably to protecting it for different persons.
It is an error, from within the perspective of accurately recognizing the
importance of what is at stake for each person, to regard the risk of becoming
infected with HIV as having only secondary relevance in comparison with the
burdens of being infected with HIV. The risk of infection is a risk of suffering
exactly the same burdens. If people who are infected with HIV have a right not to
suffer those burdens when their infection could be treated at little cost to others,
people who are at risk of infection equally have a right not to be exposed to that
risk when their exposure could be prevented at little cost to others. Thus,
recognition of health-related human rights only brings into focus the fact that
there is a problem of how to allocate resources between treatment and
prevention. It cannot on its own determine the solution in favor of treatment or
prevention. 104
Another problem with the idea of "basic" health care is that needs which are
basic in the sense of essential to survival cannot always be met by interventions
that are basic in the sense of cheap and simple. For many persons, in the face of
life-threatening conditions prevalent in their population, staying above even a
minimal threshold of well-being and meaningful agency may require access to
relatively highly-skilled medical personnel and to a broadly functional health
system. One signal example in global health is maternal health and survival.
Every year, an estimated 529,000 women die in pregnancy or childbirth, an
estimated 9.5 million women suffer serious illness related to pregnancy, and an
estimated 20 million suffer pregnancy-related disabilities. 10 5 The disabilities
include a conservatively estimated 50,000 to 100,000 cases per year of obstetric
fistula, a condition of total urinary and bowel incontinence that often results in
103. See DANIELS, supra note 88, (manuscript at 372).
104. For a currently influential epidemiological analysis of the prevention/treatment question,
see Joshua A. Salomon et al., Integrating HIV Prevention and Treatment: From Slogans to Impact,
2 PLoS MED. e16 (2005).
105. Veronique Filippi et al., Maternal Health in Poor Countries: The Broader Context and a
Callfor Action, 368 LANCET 1535, 1536 (2006).
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humiliation and social exclusion in addition to horrible debilitation. 10 6 The
distribution of these burdens between affluent and poor populations is
tremendously inequitable. For instance, estimated in terms of a woman's chances
of dying as a consequence of pregnancy or childbirth over her lifetime, the risk of
maternal death ranges from 1 in 6 (Afghanistan and Sierra Leone) to 1 in 30,000
(Sweden). 
107
Maternal health and survival could be vastly improved by expanding
women's access to emergency obstetric care, delivered by health professionals
who are qualified and equipped to perform procedures like caesarean sections.' 
08
Yet, one of the greatest obstacles to improved maternal health for the girls and
women who need it most urgently is "the dire scarcity of skilled providers and
health-system infrastructure."'' 0 9 This state of affairs raises a problem of policy,
in which the investment of different amounts of time and resources needed to
train birth attendants must be traded off against rapidly expanding the extent of
coverage for women who need obstetric services. °10 It also highlights the
systemic problems that contribute to maternal morbidity and mortality in poor
populations, such as the acute crisis of health-related human resources, and the
fragility of the transportation and communication infrastructure."'
Indeed, some experts warn that the billions of dollars now becoming
available for global health may conceivably end up doing more harm than good,
due to adverse impacts on the functioning of severely strained health systems. 1
2
At the heart of the problem on the donor side is lack of coordination. Many
donors, aid programs, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are each
focused on specific diseases, to the neglect of overall health system
improvement. For example, HIV/AIDS programs have reduced the prevalence of
HIV-infection in Haiti from six to three percent between 2002 and 2006, but by
every other indicator the health status of the population worsened during this
period. 113 Generally, the influx of donor monies to fund disease-specific
programs may create an internal brain drain, siphoning skilled health workers
away from general health-care facilities. 114 This exacerbates the ill effects of the
106. WORLD HEALTH ORG., OBSTETRIC FISTULA: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CLINICAL
MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://www.who.int/
reproductive-health/docs/neonataljperinatal mortality/text.pdf; Sharon LaFraniere, Nightmare for
African Women: Birthing Injury and Little Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at Al.
107. Carine Ronsmans & Wendy J. Graham, Maternal Mortality: Who, When, Where, and Why,
368 LANCET 1189 (2006).
108. Margie Koblinsky et al., Going to Scale with Professional Skilled Care, 368 LANCET 1377
(2006).
109. Id. at 1377.
110. Id.
111. Richard Horton, Healthy Motherhood: An Urgent Call to Action, 368 LANCET 1129 (2006).
112. See, e.g., Laurie Garrett, The Challenge of Global Health, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 14 (2007).
113. Id. at 23.
114. Id.
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external brain drain caused by wealthy countries' active recruitment of nurses
and physicians from poor countries. 
115
One sensible proposal is that donor efforts should be coordinated not around
specific diseases, but around such basic goals as increasing maternal survival and
increasing overall life expectancy. 116 Beyond their intrinsic importance, maternal
survival and overall life expectancy are excellent proxy indicators for overall
health-system functioning. 17 In order to fulfill the human right to basic
necessities to the greatest extent possible, it would seem that donors interested in
global health should focus primarily on helping to build local, internally
sustainable capacity to improve such indicators among the poorest and most
vulnerable members of populations. An emphasis on reaching the neediest people
would ideally be built into every stage of health system capacity-building:
consulting stakeholders in each location to prioritize needs and identify specific
constraints on health-system performance; continuously monitoring and
evaluating programs introduced; and systematically collecting data to facilitate
global information-sharing about factors that contribute to failure and success." 
8
II. GLOBAL HEALTH AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Whatever the nature of affluent individuals' duties to meet the health-related
needs of the global poor, one important means of acting on them is to support the
activities of health professionals whose work reaches across national borders.
NGOs like Mrdecins Sans Fronti~res (MSF) offer aid in the form of medical care
and other basic necessities." 19 Government bodies, such as the U.K. Medical
Research Council (MRC) and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), and
charities, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and The Wellcome
Trust, figure prominently in medical research aimed at meeting the needs of poor
populations. 120 More broadly, global humanitarian efforts on the ambitious scale
115. Daniels, supra note 8, at 30-31. Daniels argues that the external brain drain should be
alleviated not by restricting migration (itself the object of certain human rights) but by measures
such as contributing financial resources to help poor countries retain skilled health-care personnel
by improving their working conditions.
116. Garrett, supra note 112, at 23.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., David H. Peters et al., Research for Future Health Systems, 3 GLOBAL F. UPDATE
ON RES. FOR HEALTH 133 (2006), available at http://www.futurehealthsystems.org/
publications/index.htm (outlining the research program of Future Health Systems: Innovations for
Equity, a consortium of researchers from Uganda, Nigeria, India, China, Bangladesh, the U.K., and
the U.S., funded by the U.K. Department for International Development). For a specific working
example of this approach to reviving a shattered national health system, see David H. Peters et al.,
A Balanced Scorecard for Health Services in Afghanistan, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 146
(2007).
119. See DAN BORTOLOTTI, HOPE IN HELL: INSIDE THE WORLD OF DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS
(2004).
120. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO HEALTHCARE IN
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of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria ultimately depend
on the work of physicians and scientists to carry out their aims. 121
It is debatable whether physicians and scientists as individuals, simply by
virtue of their professional qualifications, have special duties to help the global
poor that others do not have. 22 Does every individual trained in obstetrics and
gynecology have a duty to spend at least several weeks a year helping women in
poor countries who suffer from obstetric fistula or helping to build local capacity
in emergency obstetric care to prevent maternal death and disability? 123 Maybe,
but that is not a problem that this Article takes up here. The point for present
purposes is rather that, if all affluent individuals have some duty to help the
global poor (be it a duty of benevolence or a duty of justice), then, in order to act
on that duty effectively, most of us must depend on others who both hold the
relevant professional qualifications and choose to employ them in the service of
this cause. Physicians and scientists, acting as agents of the donors, sponsors, and
organizations who fund their programs, then find themselves offering health care
or conducting health-related research in locales where available resources can
hardly begin to meet even the basic needs of the resident population. 2 4 The
question is, what do physicians and scientists working under those circumstances
owe to needy members of the host population?
This Part considers this question under two distinct headings: aid and
research. What the aid versus research distinction tracks here is not primarily the
qualifications of individual professionals, but rather the aims of the organizations
for which they work. Organizational aims determine these individuals'
institutional roles, thereby strongly influencing the nature of their obligations as
professionals.
At this point, a brief terminological aside is in order. In this Part,
"organization" and cognate terms are used to refer to particular corporate agents
like MSF or specific kinds of corporate agents like NGOs and research
universities. A corporate agent is an agent whose policies are typically
determined, and whose actions are typically executed, through the organized
activity of multiple individual persons acting in roles established by the agent
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28-29 (2002); Okie, supra note 3.
121. Gill Walt & Kent Buse, Global Cooperation in International Public Health, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 2, at 649.
122. See John D. Arras, Fair Benefits in International Medical Research, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., May-June 2004, at 3; Samia A. Hurst & Alex Mauron, Allocating Resources in Humanitarian
Medicine (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
123. LaFraniere, supra note 106.
124. A professional who works with poverty-stricken populations may be either an expatriate
citizen of an affluent country (e.g. a French physician working in South Africa), an expatriate
citizen of another country where people suffer from poverty in large numbers (e.g. a Sudanese
scientist working in Malawi), or a co-citizen with members of the local population (e.g. a Ugandan
scientist working in Uganda). In any case, questions about obligations to the poor arise from
professional-role ethics in the context of access to institutional resources.
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itself in keeping with the specific kind of agent it is. (So, for example, a hospital
is the kind of corporate agent that normally must establish roles for executives,
board members, legal counsel, administrators, physicians, nurses, social workers,
and so on.) "Institution" and cognate terms are used to refer to the type of social
impact and consequent ethical accountability that many such corporate agents
have. Somewhat like individual persons, and unlike states, institutions exercise
considerable freedom to set their own policies and act accordingly. They are
often not bound by any formal constitutional or contractual relationships to
outside individuals whose conduct the institution will affect. Yet, more like states
and less like individual persons, institutions may have an extensive, enduring,
and causally traceable impact on the surrounding society through the activity of
setting and executing their policies. Finally, discussion of the "institutional role"
of individuals alludes to two facts: (1) their professional responsibilities are
ordered and regulated to a great extent by the policies of the organizations for
whom they work; and (2) in carrying out those responsibilities, individuals
participate in the broader social impact that their organization is making.
In organizational and professional ethics generally, a great deal more
research is needed on the problem of how institutional roles ought to shape the
professional obligations of the individuals who occupy them. Dennis F.
Thompson's essay, The Institutional Turn in Professional Ethics, offers a helpful
framework for discussion. 125. Thompson distinguishes two problems of
institutional ethics, the problem of representation and the problem of authority:
The general point is that an institution needs to have a policy, which means that
(a) the rules may require individuals in the institution to act in ways that they
may not otherwise act on their own; and (b) someone has to decide what the
rules are. The first is the problem of representation, and the second, the
problem of authority. 126
Both problems are prominent in the operation of institutions that reach
across borders in the service of global health. Section A considers examples of
these problems as they occur in the transnational activities of non-governmental
aid organizations. Section B looks at the activities of research organizations that
are based in affluent countries but study scientific questions of importance to
poor populations elsewhere.
A. Non-Governmental Aid Organizations
MSF is a good example because its operations have been carefully studied
by researchers using methods of social science and, in the case of at least one
125. Dennis F. Thompson, The Institutional Turn in Professional Ethics, in RESTORING
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT, BusINEss, AND HEALTHCARE 267 (Dennis F. Thompson
ed., 2005).
126. Id. at 269.
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researcher, philosophy as well. In collaboration with Eric Goemaere, head of
MSF's South African Mission, medical sociologist Renee Fox has been studying
the process of "patient selection" for antiretroviral treatment (ART) in MSF's
project in Khayelitsha, South Africa. 127 Meanwhile, philosopher Lisa Fuller has
been engaged in a multi-stage collaborative study of "ethics, principles, and
decision-making" in the activities of MSF-Holland. 128 Fuller first studied field
operations through MSF-Holland's Nairobi Office and its projects in Galcayo,
Somalia, and Mandera, Kenya, and then studied the organizational decision-
making process at MSF-Holland's Amsterdam headquarters. While Fox's and
Fuller's studies should be understood in the first instance as windows onto the
particular MSF units they observed, the interpretations offered by both
researchers also lend themselves to generalization, at least with respect to ethical
analysis of the problems in institutional ethics and institution-related professional
ethics that MSF exemplifies.
In brief, the background of MSF's Khayelitsha project is as follows. As Fox
and Goemaere recount, the residents of Khayelitsha are some 500,000 extremely
impoverished people, many suffering from lack of running water, electricity, and
decent shelter. Rates of unemployment and violent crime, including domestic
violence, are high. Prevalence of HIV/AIDS among pregnant women is
approximately twenty-six percent. At the time of writing, the MSF Khayelitsha
project was providing ART to roughly 2000 of the 8000 patients with HIV/AIDS
who frequent the MSF clinics. With the support of the Global Fund, financing for
ART is now ample, but its provision is constrained by the brain drain of
physicians and nurses from South Africa to higher-income positions in other
countries (mainly the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia).
Thus, MSF must still practice patient selection, in effect rationing treatment. 129
MSF clinicians provide the leadership and main membership of several
selection committees in Khayelitsha, one committee per HIV clinic. 130 In order to
be selected for ART, prospective patients must in principle satisfy the whole of
an extensive set of criteria, including medical, social, and behavioral
components. 131 In practice, however, as Fox and Goemaere report, "the most
127. Renee C. Fox & Eric Goemaere, They Call It 'Patient Selection' in Khayelitsha: The
Experience of Mdecins Sans Frontikres-South Africa in Enrolling Patients To Receive
Antiretroviral Treatment for HIVIAIDS, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 302 (2006).
128. Lisa Fuller, Justified Commitments? Considering Resource Allocation and Fairness in
M~decins Sans Frontikres-Holland, 6 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHics 59, 61 (2006).
129. Fox & Goemaere, supra note 127, at 302-04. A cautionary note: Presumably, as in any
organization, MSF procedures are open to change, and might be different by the time this Article is
published. This Article discusses the procedures that Fox and Goemaere reported to be in place at
the time of their 2006 publication in the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
130. Id. at 304. Although each committee also includes a patient, Fox and Goemaere focus on
the feelings and deliberations reported by clinical personnel and do not report on patients'
contributions or reactions to committee proceedings in their article.
13 1. Id. at 304-06. Behavioral components of the selection criteria are meant to indicate the
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striking feature of [committee] deliberations is the inward pressure they feel to
accept patients for treatment."' 132 They tend to admit even patients who do not
satisfy all the criteria; indeed, they almost never reject candidates, preferring
instead to categorize them as needing further preparation with respect to social
and behavioral criteria.' 33 The pressure they feel to start patients on ART
intensifies "when they are confronted with patients in a very advanced, rapidly
evolving stage of HIV/AIDS who have a high risk of imminent death."'
13 4
Clinicians are inclined to accept these patients ahead of up to 500 patients who
also satisfy basic medical criteria (primarily, a CD4 count of less than 200/ml)-
even though they know that prioritizing such desperately ill patients "will not
only delay the treatment of other patient-candidates who may have been waiting
longer, but may also contribute to the further deterioration of their immune
function because of the extended waiting time."' 
35
MSF's Khayelitsha project, as described in this scenario, exemplifies classic
problems of priority-setting and public health ethics. 136 Ruth Macklin and
Solomon Benatar have offered comments analyzing Khayelitsha in those
terms. 137 My purpose here is to look at the same scenario from the viewpoint of
institutional ethics.
Thompson's problem of representation appears in the anguished attempts of
MSF's Khayelitsha clinicians to apply principled criteria in selecting patients for
ART. As Thompson writes, the problem is that the rules of an institution's policy
''may require individuals in the institution to act in ways that they may not
otherwise act on their own."' 138 He further specifies the problem as follows:
"Whom does the individual professional represent when acting as an official of
the institution?"' 139 It seems that MSF clinicians in Khayelitsha feel torn between
two attitudes toward treating their clinic's patients. They feel that they should
serve as advocates for each individual patient, responding most intently to the
patient whose needs of the moment are most urgent. At the same time, they
occupy an institutional role as committee members allocating limited resources to
serve their organization's client population, all of whom are extremely needy. If
likelihood of adherence to treatment. Part of the rationale for emphasizing adherence is to avert the
development of drug-resistant strains of HIV.
132. Id. at 306.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 308.
135. Id. at 308-09.
136. Daniels, supra note 9, at 23-24.
137. Solomon Benatar, Facing Ethical Challenges in Rolling Out Antiretroviral Treatment in
Resource-Poor Countries: Comment on "They Call It 'Patient Selection' in Khayelitsha," 15
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 322 (2006); Ruth Macklin, No Shortage of Dilemmas:
Comment on "They Call It 'Patient Selection' in Khayelitsha," 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 313 (2006).
138. Thompson, supra note 125, at 269.
139. Id. at 271.
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each of these physicians were acting "on their own," they would probably be
strongly inclined toward acting on the individual-patient-advocate attitude. But
the institutional role that they occupy requires, at least formally and in principle,
that in their decisions as committee members they respond primarily to the needs
of patients as a population.
These MSF clinicians lack certain luxuries present in situations that lie
closer to the institutional ideal. Consider Thompson's sensible prescription for
the operation of hospitals: "Some division of moral labor is necessary in any
complex institution. The doctor at the bedside should not have cost containment
uppermost in his mind, and the CEO of the HMO (even if he is a doctor) cannot
give absolute priority to the individual welfare of each patient." 140 A combination
of dire circumstances and organizational aims may often force practitioners of
humanitarian medicine into the position of attempting to fill both kinds of roles,
which may be psychologically untenable for someone who cares about
professional integrity. A plausible interpretation of the MSF clinicians' tendency
to subvert their own formal patient-selection criteria is that doing so is a way to
relieve this acute tension, even if only temporarily and with uncomfortable
residual doubts. Their experience highlights an important point about the
problem of representation, as emphasized by Thompson. It is not merely a
problem facing individuals who wish to maintain professional integrity, but more
deeply a problem that the institution must address in its design of the roles it will
ask professionals to occupy. 141 An institution's policies stand in need of revision
if they regularly place professionals in the type of bind suffered by MSF
clinicians in Khayelitsha.
Regarding the design of institutional policy, the problem of authority presses
the still deeper question of who should participate in making policy and in what
ways. In particular, organizations that provide services like health care need to
confront the issue of how to involve, or at the very least how to consult, the
populations they purport to serve. 142 A tremendously challenging version of this
problem for aid organizations like MSF is the issue of their accountability to
needy populations, including both actual and potential recipients of medical aid.
This has been the subject of Lisa Fuller's research with MSF. 1
43
Fuller addresses MSF's procedures for deliberating and deciding on
questions of resource allocation on the largest scale. Where, and when, should
MSF open, close, or restructure specific medical aid projects? MSF and other
NGOs are vital in the provision of health care among extremely needy
populations. Yet strikingly, in contrast with government agencies (such as
Ministries of Health), which also need to decide how to allocate health care
resources, the operational autonomy typical of NGOs leaves them with
140. Id. at 272.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 272-73.
143. Fuller, supra note 128.
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"complete discretionary power" over all their allocation decisions, including the
most fundamental ones of where, when, for how long, with what aims, and by
what measures of success or failure they should operate their programs.'1 44 Until
recently, as a matter of formal organizational accountability, populations of the
kind these NGOs purport to serve have not had much of a say in such decision-
making. 145 Fuller reports that NGOs are just beginning to explore mechanisms to
improve accountability to their intended beneficiaries. 1
46
As a first step toward developing "a full theory of NGO accountability to
recipients in need of medical care," Fuller critically examines the justifications
most often used in MSF's decisions on large-scale resource allocation. 147 She
does so with an eye to the legitimacy of these justifications from the viewpoint of
those who need medical assistance. She analyzes the allocation of scarce NGO-
provided medical aid as a case of decision-making that calls for justification
through a deliberative process incorporating "accountability for
reasonableness."' 148 In the case of MSF and similar NGOs, due attention to
accountability for reasonableness would acknowledge "that potential recipients
of aid have a vital interest in MSF's decisions, while at the same time
accommodating the fact that resources are limited and so not all suitable
populations can be benefited." 1
49
Fuller finds that MSF medical personnel feel a strong obligation to stay and
work with communities with whom they have become involved through existing
projects dedicated to general health care. 150 In contrast, projects narrowly
focused on a single short-term outcome, such as the control of a specific disease
outbreak, allow for statistical measures to determine when the outcome has been
achieved, providing an identifiable reason for MSF to end its relationship with
the community at a particular time.1 51 General health care projects are more
problematic for personnel to close, even if they have achieved overall
improvements to the point where other emergencies elsewhere clearly present
greater need from an impartial perspective. Personnel feel that they have
committed to a relationship with the people who live in the community, so that if
no government or other system is prepared to take responsibility for meeting the
144. Id. at 60.
145. Id.
146. Id. As examples, Fuller cites The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum
Standards in Disaster Response, http://www.sphereproject.org/ (last visited May 3, 2007) and
Alnoor Ebrahim, Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs, 31 WORLD DEv. 813 (2003).
147. Fuller, supra note 128, at 60.
148. Id.; see also DANIELS & SABIN, supra note 89, at 44. Thompson, supra note 125, at 274,
also suggests procedures modeled on deliberative democracy as a way for institutions to handle the
problem of authority.
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community's general health care needs, they feel obligated to stay. 1
52
Another kind of case presents similar difficulties. MSF's policy for certain
HIV-treatment programs is to demonstrate treatment feasibility in selected low-
resource or politically unstable environments. 153 What drives the policy is the
long-term goal of helping to make HIV treatment available to as many people as
possible, in contrast with the alternative of making treatment available to fewer
people by running permanent programs in only a few places. To this end, MSF
sometimes employs a time-limited strategy, staying in any given host country no
longer than roughly five years. During this period, the organization's aims are (a)
to demonstrate the feasibility of HIV treatment in the local setting, and (b) to find
or pressure other agencies, which may include the government of the host
country, to continue care for HIV patients after the temporary MSF program
closes. 154
Yet MSF field staff, influenced by sensibilities of the kind Fuller has
observed, say that they find it very hard to leave the host country at the appointed
time, especially when they are uncertain about whether local efforts to continue
therapy will be successful. 155 They have in some cases actually reversed
organizational close-down decisions, prolonging the stay of their clinics past the
designated time to leave. 156 This could undermine the very policies that
ostensibly form the raison d'Otre for the programs they serve. For one thing, if
the MSF program prolongs its stay indefinitely, it may have the unwelcome
effect of actually relaxing pressure on other capable agencies: Why should they
commit resources if MSF will take care of it? More important for the present
discussion, another consequence of staying too long is that while the local
population gains further benefits in addition to what they have already received,
other needy populations elsewhere lose the opportunity to have any such benefit
at all.
When attachments to communities already being served dominate decision-
making at the level of headquarters as well, the organization is in effect
systematically making decisions that seriously affect candidate populations
elsewhere for reasons that might not be legitimately justifiable to these
populations. Fuller distinguishes between a "relational" perspective more
appropriate to field staff who feel the pull of existing community ties, and a
"comparative" perspective more appropriate to headquarters, which in the ideal
case impartially considers fairness in the feasible distribution of good outcomes
for all candidate populations, whether they are current beneficiaries or
152. Id.
153. Interview by Samia Hurst, Maitre assistante, Institute for Biomedical Ethics, Geneva
University Medical School, with MSF personnel, June 5, 2005 (on file with author). Thanks to
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prospective beneficiaries.' 57 She suggests a number of adjustments that might
facilitate due incorporation of the comparative perspective into the organization's
decision-making. For instance, she proposes a constraint on the content of
justifications for continuing existing projects, to rule out "[t]he mere fact that
MSF-H[olland] has been engaged with a given group of people for some
time." 158
While Fuller is on the right track in emphasizing organizational
accountability to all needy populations, her proposed adjustments include such
populations in the decision-making process only by turning the minds of
organizational officials in the direction of an impartial perspective. What about
more directly seeking real input from the people who actually have the needs?
One researcher, Stuart Rennie, has recently proposed a study of community
attitudes toward ART rationing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 1
59
As of 2004, only about two percent of people in the DRC who needed ART were
receiving it. The DRC's national plan estimates that, at best, only sixty-nine
percent of approximately 340,000 people who need ART can receive it by 2009,
in part because of the exodus of skilled health care personnel (again, brain drain)
and the country's devastating recent history of violent conflict. 160 Rationing ART
will in all likelihood be inevitable in the DRC for some time.
Rennie asked MSF-Belgium headquarters for permission to interview its
DRC field personnel in support of his inquiry. He reports his astonishment upon
finding that MSF was unwilling to participate, due to what he portrays as an
ideological rejection of the very idea of rationing. An editorial in Developing
World Bioethics (the journal that published Rennie's critique of the position he
attributes to MSF, alongside a response by MSF officials) accuses MSF of
"taking some kind of pride in not having any kind of ethical resource allocation
process in place."' 161 The editorial's authors rest their accusation on two sources:
first, Fuller's findings, which the authors interpret as evidence that MSF has no
"uniform, transparent policies" for deciding when, where, and why to open,
close, or modify its projects; second, the words of the responding MSF officials
themselves, which characterize rationing as "a tactical acceptance of
injustice."
162
The worry expressed in MSF's stated position is that those who accept
157. Fuller, supra note 128, at 69.
158. Id at 64-65.
159. Stuart Rennie, Is It Ethical To Study What Ought Not To Happen?, 6 DEVELOPING WORLD
BIOETHICS 71 (2006).
160. Id. at 71 (citing WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNAIDS & DRC NAT'L AIDS CONTROL PROGRAM,
PLAN NATIONAL D'EXTENSION DE L'AcctS AUX TRAITEMENTS ANTI-RETROvRAuX EN RDC (2005-
2009) (2005)); WORLD HEALTH ORG., '3 BY 5' PROGRESS REPORT (2004).
161. Willem A. Landman & Udo Schuklenk, Midecins Sans Frontibres Under the Spotlight, 6
DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS iii (2006).
162. Id. (quoting Rony Zachariah et al., Do Aid Agencies Have an Ethical Duty To Comply with
Researchers? A Response to Rennie, 6 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 78 (2006)).
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rationing as inevitable may be indulging their own and others' complacency
toward the shortfall of resources available to meet the needs of the poor:
We consider rationing as a tactical acceptance of injustice that aims to respond
to imbalances by offering only limited assistance for a chosen few. Some may
view this as a naYve starting point, but that is what principles aspiring for justice
should be inspired by. MSF believes that a technical approach to political
distortions will only refine injustice. When people die, a technique that allows
discrimination between who will die fairly or unfairly doesn't seem the right
163answer.
The MSF officials who take this stand against "rationing" also insist that
MSF's explicitly endorsed "patient selection" policy (as employed, for instance,
in the Khayelitsha project described above) is not equivalent to "rationing":
Within MSF's programmes, the medical and social criteria applied to determine
who needs antiretroviral therapy are employed not as rationing criteria but as
good medical practice and public health practice. Medical criteria (clinical
staging, CD4 count, and viral load) are employed to ensure that only people
who need to be treated are treated; social criteria ... are used as public health
provisions to avoid providing antiretroviral therapy to patients with a high
probability of non-adherence and in doing so promoting drug resistance.
1 64
However, based on a neutral definition of "rationing," MSF's "patient
selection" policy is indeed a form of rationing. In economics, "rationing" refers
to "any policy or practice that restricts consumption of goods."' 165 The market
rations goods by price. When demand exceeds supply for non-market goods like
the ART dispensed by MSF, the consumption of the good is perforce restricted in
some other way. 166 Any policy that applies criteria to restrict the consumption of
a good, however the criteria may be regarded or conceived of by those who apply
them, amounts to rationing in this neutral sense.
Terminology aside, there is a point of principle lodged against MSF by its
critics. While, of course, every possible measure must be taken toward hastening
the arrival of the day when scarce resources like ART are universally accessible
to those in need, that day is not yet here. And even if, per impossibile, every
effort in its direction were to meet with perfect success, it would still not be here
for at least a few years. 167 In the interim the impossibility of offering ART to
163. Rony Zachariah et al., Do Aid Agencies Have an Ethical Duty To Comply with
Researchers? A Response to Rennie, 6 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 80 (2006).
164. Id.
165. Sydney Rosen et al., Hard Choices: Rationing Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV/AIDS in
Africa, 365 LANCET 354, 354 (2005) (citing JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(2d ed. 2004)).
166. Id.
167. See Rennie, supra note 159.
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everyone who needs it would remain, and in the far-from-ideal actual world it
will remain well into the foreseeable future. Fairness to people in need thus
requires transparent, consistently applied policies for allocating ART, through
processes of decision-making that offer accountability for reasonableness. The
interests of people who need ART are poorly served by any organization that
plays an important part in distributing ART among them, yet avoids the
formulation and execution of policies for doing so fairly. Finally, learning more
about the conceptions of fairness held by people in need is an elementary and
crucial step toward developing any decision-making process, whether in
government agencies or NGOs, that would be truly accountable to them. 1
68
If it is correct to assert that the institutional culture of MSF, in many respects
a laudable organization, is biased against formulating fair policies in a
responsible manner, here is one way to diagnose its dysfunction. Fuller observes
that "most people at headquarters have extensive field experience," a background
which makes them "extremely sympathetic" to the partial, relational perspective
at the expense of the impartial., comparative perspective. 69 But any sound
rationing policy would have to be grounded in the comparative perspective.
Over-representation of the relational perspective in deliberations about large-
scale resource allocation would tend, inappropriately, to duplicate at the level of
headquarters the psychological propensity of field staff to shy away from the
comparative perspective. Even if a bias toward the relational perspective helps
individual professionals in the field to cope (however imperfectly) with the role
conflicts engendered by the problem of representation, the institutional leadership
ought to correct for that bias in its own policy-making rather than take up the bias
and amplify it into a systematic evasion of the problem of authority.
MSF is not an isolated example. On the whole, shortfalls in institutional
accountability appear to be common among humanitarian aid organizations.
Rarely do these groups consult beneficiaries in evaluating the impact of their
efforts. 170 In addition, another telling sign is the absence in the published
literature of a significant body of evidence to assess, by any measure, the impact
and cost-effectiveness of standard emergency interventions. 17' These standard
168. Among the questions Rennie seeks to answer are: "What do affected community members
find fair in regard to the allocation of this very scarce and vital medical resource? Do their
conceptions of fairness in treatment access rationing differ from those of national or international
authorities who will most likely have the greatest say in the matter?" Id. at 71-72.
169. Fuller, supra note 128, at 69.
170. Shannon Doocy et al., The Delivery of Essential Humanitarian Services After the Tsunami
in Aceh, Indonesia, 4 J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 43, 44 (2006) (citing HUMANITARIAN POLICY GROUP,
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN Am: A REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE (2004)).
171. ARABELLA DUFFIELD ET AL., REvIEW OF THE PUBLISHED LITERATURE FOR THE IMPACT AND
COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF Six NUTRITION RELATED EMERGENCY INTERVENTIONS (2004), available at
http://www.ennonline.net/docs/ENNCIDASFPREPORT.pdf (reviewing published papers "to assess
the impact and cost-effectiveness of six health-related emergency interventions"); Arabella
Duffield et al., Evidence Base for Interventions in Complex Emergencies, 365 LANCET 842 (2005).
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interventions, which consume large amounts of aid money, include nutritional
supplementation, measles vaccination, vitamin A supplementation, and anti-
malarial bed-nets. 172 Aid organizations, lacking an evidence base to assess the
options for deploying possible interventions, are likely to persist in allocating
their precious resources according to status quo policies around which they
happened to build up their expertise and declared their organizational mandates,
but which remain untested and unchallenged by systematic observation. 173 The
authors of a recent report on this subject recommend the creation of "an
independent body or institutional mechanism" responsible for amassing the
necessary evidence base and using it to advocate improvements in practice. 174
In sum, for any institutional program that undertakes to distribute basic
necessities to the very poor, two fundamental ethical considerations are fairness
and cost-effectiveness. Most humanitarian aid organizations, however admirable
their motivations and however heroic their exertions in the field, seem to stand in
need of marked improvement on both counts. 175 A necessary component of
taking each consideration seriously is consultation with intended beneficiaries. 1
76
B. Research Organizations
Growing attention in bioethics focuses on a cluster of questions about the
ethics of international medical research. 177 One way to frame these questions is
to start with what we might call the "domestic" ethics of medical research with
human participants and see what happens when we extend it to the context of
For three out of six common emergency interventions, no published impact-assessment studies
appeared, while the other three were the subject of nine, fifteen, and sixteen impact-assessment
studies, respectively. With respect to cost-effectiveness, only one economic-evaluation study was
published on each of only three interventions out of six. Duffield et al., supra, at 842-43.
172. Duffield et al., supra note 171, at 843.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Evidence and explanations for a prevailing lack of accountability in philanthropy, the genre
of which humanitarian aid is a species, are offered in Editorial, The Business of Giving,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2006, at 3-5.
176. A recent survey of Indonesian households displaced by the December 2004 tsunami
exemplifies what might be accomplished by systematically studying the impact of humanitarian
efforts, and in particular by including beneficiary consultation. Doocy et al., supra note 170. Other
useful sources include the series of country-specific monographs produced by the Active Learning
Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). See ACTIVE
LEARNING NETWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION, GLOBAL
STUDY ON CONSULTATION WITH AND PARTICIPATION BY BENEFICIARIES AND AFFECTED POPULATIONS
IN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING, MANAGING, MONITORING AND EVALUATING HUMANITARIAN ACTION
(2002), available at http://www.globalstudyparticipation.org/english/tor.htm.
177. See, e.g., ETHICAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: A CASEBOOK (James
V. Lavery et al. eds., 2007); RUTH MACKLIN, DOUBLE STANDARDS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004).
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international research. 178 This Section addresses research sponsored by
organizations in affluent countries to study scientific questions of import for poor
populations, meaning that the social value of answering the questions under study
lies in their relevance to the needs of the poor.
Among several core duties of any medical researcher working with human
participants are duties to respect the participants and not to harm them in the
course of the study. One question raised by the disparities in wealth, health, and
health care that pervade the context of international research is whether
researchers also owe various kinds of benefits to impoverished participants. We
can think of the benefits in question as radiating outward in several directions
from the uncontested core duties.
It is uncontroversial that researchers have a duty to provide basic medical
care pertaining directly to the interaction between the medical condition under
study and the intervention that the study is testing, at least for as long as the
participant is enrolled in the study. But for impoverished participants whose
society offers them little or no other source of medical care, do researchers also
have a duty to treat conditions other than the one under study? If so, which ones
and to what extent? This is the problem of ancillary care, and it calls for much
further inquiry. 179 While ancillary care is primarily a matter of what should
happen during an individual's study participation, another problem that needs
further inquiry is what, if any, benefits participants should receive after the study
(post-trial benefits). 180 Most centrally, if the evidence shows that participants
who receive the intervention under study have benefited from it, do researchers
have a duty to continue treatment for impoverished participants who have no way
178. In the United States, ethical guidelines for research with human subjects are rooted in the
Belmont Report. See NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), available at
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. For a systematic framework of ethical requirements
that integrates the Belmont Report with leading international principles and guidelines, see Ezekiel
J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 2701 (2000) [hereinafter
Emanuel, Clinical Research]. For an extension of this framework to the circumstances of research
in low-resource settings, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research in
Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical Research, 189 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES
930 (2004) [hereinafter Emanuel, Benchmarks]. See also NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,
ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2001); Nuffield Council on Bioethics, supra note 120.
179. See Leah Belsky & Henry S. Richardson, Medical Researchers' Ancillary Clinical Care
Responsibilities, 328 BMJ 1494 (2004); Neal Dickert et al., Ancillary-Care Responsibilities in
Observational Research: Two Cases, Two Issues, 369 LANCET 874 (2007); Henry S. Richardson,
Gradations of Ancillary-Care Responsibility for HIV-AIDS in Developing Countries, AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH (forthcoming 2007); Henry S. Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care
Responsibilities of Medical Researchers: An Ethical Framework for Thinking About the Clinical
Care that Researchers Owe Their Subjects, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 25.
180. Christine Grady, The Challenge of Continued Post-Trial Access to Beneficial Treatment, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 425,425-27 (2005).
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of securing access to it when the study ends? If so, for how long?
Before we take up the question of obligations to provide such benefits, an
issue that calls for some comment is "undue influence."' 181 For research in low-
resource settings, one might worry that in the prevailing absence of adequate
medical care, the offer of ancillary care or post-trial benefits could lead people to
participate in research when, in the absence of such benefits and all else being
equal, they would otherwise decline. However, it has been argued that the
influence of such incentives is "undue" only if it actually distorts people's
judgment to the point that they make choices harmful to their interests.1 82 Since
no research protocol that poses excessive risks or burdens to participants ought to
pass independent review, a properly reviewed study should already be such that a
prudent person could reasonably choose to participate in it, whatever the
additional benefits or lack thereof 18 3 The general form of this point is that many
safeguards ought to be in place throughout the research process-from study
design, through independent review, to the monitoring of participants' safety and
well-being, to follow-up as needed after their participation-to assure that risks
and burdens are not excessive. If any protective concern should be intensified by
gaping disparities of wealth between prospective participants and the researchers
who ask them to take part, it is the concern to minimize the risks and burdens of
the research. When that concern receives the attention it is due, there should be
no residual worry that benefits otherwise indicated by ethical considerations-
especially benefits owed to participants-are somehow ethically suspect.'
84
Returning to the topic at hand, one way to argue for some duty to provide
ancillary care or post-trial benefits might be to invoke global justice.18 5 When
medical research in severely impoverished populations is sponsored by agencies
in wealthy countries, it may seem that research sponsors, if not scientists
themselves, have an obligation of justice to provide such further benefits, as a
gesture toward redressing the vast resource inequalities that their very presence
181. The U.S. federal regulations governing research with human subjects address this topic
under the heading of informed consent. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2006) ("An investigator shall seek...
[informed] consent only under circumstances that provide the prospective subject... opportunity
to consider whether or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue
influence.").
182. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns About Undue Inducement, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
100, 101 (2004).
183. Id. at 104.
184. A kindred set of worries involves research in low-resource settings that is undertaken not
for the benefit of the poor, but in order to develop treatments for people in the affluent world. There
are important reasons to question the ethical legitimacy of recruiting members of medically
deprived populations to participate in such research, even if risks and dangers are minimized and
the actual risk/benefit profile would in itself make participation reasonable. See Jennifer S.
Hawkins, Justice and Placebo Controls, 32 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 467 (2006).
185. See generally Alex John London, Justice and the Human Development Approach to
International Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 24 (arguing that global justice is
the key to a comprehensive re-conception of the ethics of international research).
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in the host country makes embarrassingly obvious. But appeals to global justice
might just as well support a policy of curtailing further benefits: Scientifically
valid clinical research on questions important to poor populations is urgently
needed, and resources for conducting such research are limited (especially when
a commercial profit motive is absent). Arguably, so far as global justice is
concerned, scientists and research sponsors ought to focus their resources on
doing research and leave social welfare to others. 1
86
As a supplement or alternative to invoking global justice, it is illuminating to
examine researchers' and sponsors' obligations to research participants through
the lens of institutional ethics. To begin with, consider more closely the
relationship between researchers and their institutional sponsors, and the
relationship of both to research participants. Scientists who conduct medical
research in low-resource settings are acting, in part, in the role of agents
representing their sponsors. Producing generalizable knowledge through
scientific inquiry is typically the sponsor's chief objective in funding the
researcher's work. At the same time, the social value of the expected scientific
results supplies part of the ethical rationale for researchers' coming into
medically intimate contact with participants. 187 Even when sponsors and
researchers intend the social value of their scientific results to accrue mainly to
the poor, the way in which they expect this to come about is through the
generalizability of their results to populations beyond the one immediately under
study. Thus the researchers, not only in pursuing their own projects, but also by
acting on behalf of their sponsors, are asking participants to take on the risks and
burdens of research in the service of other people. It is this feature of any
researcher-participant relationship that engenders the researcher's distinctive
professional obligation not to disregard the participant's well-being. 188 Since the
sponsoring institution is a party to putting the researcher (as its representative and
agent) in this situation, the sponsoring institution is also, in some sense, a party to
the obligations that arise from the researcher's professional relationship with
participants.
In the context of research with participants in low-resource settings, due
regard for their well-being raises the problem of responding to at least some
aspects of their medical needs, which, in more comfortable circumstances, the
researcher could simply address through referral to existing services. A case in
point is the question of providing post-trial access in ART trials for impoverished
study participants who have benefited from ART during the study, but cannot
186. At most, on this view, global justice requires researchers to propose scientific questions
whose answers will have value for poor populations, to conduct scientifically valid research, to
publicize their results, and perhaps to press for the incorporation of their findings into equitable
national and global health policy.
187. See Emanuel, Clinical Research, supra note 178; Emanuel, Benchmarks (2004), supra note
178.
188. Maria Merritt, Moral Conflict in Clinical Trials, 115 ETHics 306, 312, 322 (2005).
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afford to secure access to it afterward. Recent policy guidance from the NIH
encourages sponsored researchers who foresee these circumstances to coordinate
plans ahead of time with host-country agencies, so that trial participants can
secure ART through local treatment sites supported by international aid programs
like the Global Fund. 189 This policy guidance seems to be a good-faith attempt to
treat the Global Fund and similar programs as "existing services," to the end of
acknowledging researchers' professional obligation not to disregard the well-
being of their participants. Researchers' home organizations (for example, their
university institutional review boards) and other sponsoring agencies might well
like to encourage compliance with the NIH policy guidance on post-trial ART, as
a solution to one instance of the "problem of representation." 190 Such
encouragement is a convenient and low-cost expression of institutional support
for researchers who feel obligated to assure participants of post-trial ART. It
relieves researchers of worries about incurring this professional obligation in the
absence of an institutionally endorsed means of fulfilling it.
But even if the NIH policy guidance for post-trial ART does solve the
problem of representation, it does so only at the cost of exacerbating the
"problem of authority."' 91 What raises the problem of authority is a severe
shortage of ART, which requires rationing among those in urgent need. This
same shortage is what originally made the host country a good candidate for
international aid from programs like the Global Fund. 192 To pursue special
arrangements as encouraged by the NIH policy guidance could be, in effect, to
request that ART trial participants be offered special priority for access to ART
at the expense of other similarly needy compatriots. 193 But legitimate
justifications for rationing the resources of international aid programs in low-
resource settings must extend beyond special relationships like the researcher-
participant relationship. As we saw above, the reasons given for the priorities set
in rationing must be justifiable even to the people who lose out.' 94 It is of
questionable legitimacy to appeal to the special researcher-participant
relationship to justify asking research participants' similarly needy compatriots,
who may not have had the opportunity to participate in ART trials, to postpone or
give up their own chance at access to ART in deference to participants. 195 More
generally, as a rule, no foreign research sponsor has legitimate authority to direct
189. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, GUIDANCE FOR ADDRESSING THE PROVISION OF ANTIRETROVIRAL
TREATMENT FOR TRIAL PARTICIPANTS FOLLOWING THEIR COMPLETION OF NIH-FUNDED HIV
ANTIRETROVIRAL TREATMENT TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005), available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/antiretroviral.
190. THOMPSON, supra note 125.
191. Id.
192. See Rosen et al., supra note 165.
193. See Maria Merritt & Christine Grady, Reciprocity and Post-Trial Access for ART Trial
Participants, 20 AIDS 1791 (2006).
194. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
195. Merritt & Grady, supra note 193.
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the allocation of scarce resources within the host country.
On the other side, host-country authorities responsible for setting priorities,
who are ideally supposed to represent the entire constituency of people who need
ART as regarded from an impartial perspective, may be tempted by the
attractions of hosting externally sponsored research to short-circuit the
deliberative process unfairly. While it is possible that ART trial participants as a
group might be assigned priority in ART rationing through a fair deliberative
process, it can hardly be taken for granted that this would be the outcome of an
actual deliberative process, and in any given setting there may be no such process
or fairly decided set of priorities yet in place.
A promising alternative is to re-conceptualize any obligation to assure
participants of post-trial care, such that the obligation includes off-setting the
local health-system impacts of providing such care. 196 This would modify the
content of researchers' professional obligations, and the content of their
sponsors' supporting institutional policy, to register the complexities of
institutional ethics for research in low-resource settings. A sponsor ought to set
policy informed by the professional obligations that researchers incur while
acting as its agents, but a sponsor also ought to be constrained by boundaries
proper to its relationship with other institutions, such as international aid agencies
and the government of the host country. 
197
CONCLUSION
As population-level bioethics rightly gains currency, critical reflection on the
obligations of individuals, both as ordinary persons and as the occupants of
institutional roles, continues to be warranted. Considering the actions open to
individuals from the standpoint of their foreseeable impact on the health of the
world's poor, what emerges is the importance of consultation and partnership
with intended beneficiaries, together with concern to mitigate the consequences
for others who may also be affected.
The tacit assumption in the background of this discussion has been that the
affluent, in aggregate, still care too little about the poor. It does not follow,
196. This is a slight modification of a suggestion originally made by Henry S. Richardson.
Richardson, supra note 179 (manuscript at 2) ("If those who sponsor and carry out medical
research have a responsibility to provide ART to trial participants, this can be conceived as an
obligation to take the steps necessary to increase the overall availability of ART and skilled
personnel in the country or countries hosting the research, if only for the benefit of their trial
participants. By so conceiving it, we may sidestep the difficult issues that would arise if trial
participants were to be seen as competing with their co-nationals for priority in access to a fixed
supply of anti-retrovirals or medical professionals.").
197. In the case of post-trial ART, one means of satisfying both demands is for the research
sponsor to negotiate parallel funding mechanisms, through partnerships with private donors and
NGOs. See, e.g., Jintanat Ananworanich et al., Creation of a Drug Fund for Post-Clinical Trial
Access to Antiretrovirals, 364 LANCET 101 (2004).
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however, that simply caring more would be better. Clumsy attention can be
worse than none at all. An insidious impediment to making our attention properly
sensitive is indulgence (even if unwitting) in fantasy that portrays the poor as
passive victims awaiting rescue, where we as benefactors play the starring role.
We, the affluent, will do better to consider in a spirit of self-effacement the kind
and degree of assistance we owe to the poor. Ideally, the aid and scientific
research that we sponsor should proceed hand-in-hand with in-country training of
professionals, incentives to keep trained professionals there, and context-specific
health-systems operations research, all directed toward the goal of building self-
sufficient health-system capacity on a scale commensurate with the size of
populations in need.' 98 This is part of what it would take not only to meet the
needs of the poor, but also to raise and hold global standards of living above
poverty.
198. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 120; LYNN. P. FREEDMAN ET AL., UN
MILLENNIUM PROJECT TASK FORCE ON CHILD HEALTH & MATERNAL HEALTH, WHO'S GOT THE
POWER? TRANSFORMING HEALTH SYSTEMS FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN 22 (2005); Brian W.
Simpson, If We Don't Do it, Then Who? JOHNS HOPKINS PUB. HEALTH MAG., Spring 2006, at 24.
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